Solidarity in the age of globalization: Lessons from the anti-MAI and Zapatista struggles

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Abstract. While the Battle of Seattle immortalized a certain image of anti-globalization resistance, processes and agents of contestation remain sociologically underdeveloped. Even with the time-space compression afforded by new information technologies, how can a global civil society emerge among multi-cultured, multi-tongued peoples divided by miles of space and oceans of inequality? This article examines two cases that confronted the U.S. model of global corporate rule: the defeat of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), and the Zapatista challenge to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Evaluating cross-border solidarity in these cases encourages critical evaluation of claims about global civil society, the role of the Internet, and the eclipse of traditional politics in a supposedly post-national age. Contrary to orthodox globalization narratives, our analysis suggests that states, nations, and nationalisms remain key elements in contestation processes, at least in the kinds of cases examined. At the same time, transnational networks played an important role in bypassing unfavorable political opportunity structures at the domestic level, and nurtured incipient processes of framing resistance to neo-liberal globalism across national boundaries.

An introductory tale of economic nationalism, corporate rights, and resistance

The U.S. globalism model for corporate rule clauses in international agreements was first erected to defeat economic nationalism in its peripheral neighbors, Canada and Mexico. It was then exported to the world and put in such agreements as the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI). But the wheel did not stop there. The Zapatista insurgency in Mexico and the left nationalist, Canadian-led campaign against the MAI were the first blows to the Washington Consensus. They helped inspire Battle-in-Seattle type resistance wherever global elites gather. While images of Internet activists and masked Zapatistas provided the media with great visuals, the analytic lens on these matters is cloudier. What is the form, or future of resistance against globalized capital? In what ways has resistance "gone global," as sug-

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gested by popular notions of bottom-up globalization, and global civil society? Do we assume that popularly-based national identities and nationalisms or the state have become irrelevant to these struggles? Can we achieve a more nuanced understanding of how states and nations are implicated in, and changed by these conflicts? Rather than using abstract arguments to bolster one side or another of these debates, we look to these two cases to shed light on the nature of "anti-globalization" resistance, at least for cases of these kinds.[1]

First, we need to clarify what we mean by "globalism." Since the fall of communism in Eastern Europe, an over-arching ideology of neo-liberal globalism (henceforth globalism) has become the dominant force shaping governance worldwide. As an ideology, globalism coincides with phenomena that are often brought together under the broader empirical rubric of *globalization* – time-space compression, the "network" society, new modes of intensive capital accumulation, and the development of a global consciousness amongst an affluent minority.[2] Our focus here is not on what globalization is and how much of it is new, but on the governing ideology of globalism, also called structural adjustment, the "Washington Consensus," liberal productivism, and the New World Order. Whatever the term used, the prescription includes dismantling controls over foreign ownership, investment, and exchange; privatizing public enterprises and deregulating businesses; reducing public spending and corporate taxes; and balancing budgets. This formula has been written into international agreements such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the failed MAI, and the Plan Puebla Panama (PPP), and the draft of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).[3] It is also found in the WTO in the form of an "investor-state mechanism," enabling foreign corporations to challenge a wide range of government policies that threaten current or future profits. In the language of the opponents, these are not trade agreements, but *corporate rule agreements*. Economic globalization creates bundles of economic citizenship rights, but unlike national citizenship rights, these are awarded to global economic actors (firms and markets) rather than individual citizens.[4]

Such agreements emerged from a long contestation between the United States, as enforcer of U.S corporate rights, and popular movements for economic sovereignty in Canada and Mexico. In reaction to U.S. corporate invasions and goaded by popular pressure, Mexico and Canada have historically taken bold economic sovereignty measures that have been potent symbols of national identity. For example, there

were major steps to Canadianize the oil industry from the early 1970s to the early 1980s. In 1938 Mexico nationalized the oil industry and created PEMEX. "It was the first major act of its kind – the expulsion of foreign owned oil companies from an underdeveloped country in the name of national sovereignty."[5] In counter-reaction, U.S. corporate rule agreements were first shaped to respond to economic nationalisms in its resource-rich neighbors. The U.S. exported its unique tradition of giving corporations the right to sue governments directly when profits are threatened by governmental policies.[6] U.S.-style corporate rule clauses were included in the 1989 Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and were deepened in Chapter 11, NAFTA's investment chapter, in 1994. In response, Zapatista and Canadian anti-MAI leaders searched for transnational allies to combat the Washington Consensus, and focussed on self-determination and sovereignty in their own states. These cases address missing pieces in the orthodox narrative that depicts global civil society as ushering in a "post-national" age and suggest the value of examining: 1) the role of nationalism in resistance to globalism, and 2) the targeting of national governments by transnational movements – "an aspect that is largely neglected in the literature."[7]

On January 1, 1994, the day NAFTA came into effect, three thousand mainly indigenous insurgents seized four major cities in Chiapas, Mexico and declared NAFTA a death-sentence for the indigenous peoples. The uprising was led by the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN), and inspired by Emiliano Zapata, the legendary indigenous leader of the Mexican revolution for *campesino*[8] autonomy and against gringo domination. The rebels demanded local control over natural resources increasingly monopolized by transnational corporations, and a greater say in the governance of Mexico more generally. The uprising inspired activists around the world to analyze neo-liberalism at home, brought three-thousand activists from forty-five countries to Chiapas to plan a more just humanity, spawned a series of international encounters on the same theme, and inspired anti-globalism activists in Seattle, Prague, and Québec City. Perhaps inadvertently, the Zapatistas generated a loosely knit, grass-roots philosophy and solidarity network referred to as *Zapatismo*.[9] Although there were many interpretations, a broad journalistic and academic consensus identified it as the first "postmodern"[10] uprising of the post-cold war era; breaks from past modes of guerrilla struggle and the imaginative use of language are stressed, while class and nationalist elements disappear from the analytic radar. The Zapatistas' use of the Internet to

cultivate international support was heralded as the birth of a global civil society, which forced the authoritarian Mexican state to negotiate rather than suppress. While Zapatista banners appear in far-away protests against global capitalism, the impact of this type of solidarity is not clear.

While indigenous Chiapanecos identified NAFTA as a threat to their survival, global capitalist forces were busy instituting corporate rights beyond North America. Canadian activists, Tony Clarke and Maude Barlow, leaked a copy of the MAI that was being secretly negotiated at the OECD, and released Clarke's analysis entitled, "The Corporate Rule Treaty." Clarke and Barlow had been leaders of popular nationalist movements in English-Canada that helped convince a majority of Canadians to vote against the Canada-US FTA in 1988. The FTA passed despite the popular vote and laid the groundwork for NAFTA – the model for corporate rights clauses in the MAI. Chomsky wrote that "in Canada and Canada alone, the veil [of secrecy on the MAI] was broken in mid-1997 and since then has become a big issue nationally."[11] The MAI was shelved in the fall of 1998, puncturing the aura of inevitability around globalism's advance and prepared the way for the spectacular Battle in Seattle in 1999. At the same time, the MAI's defeat lead to the common interpretation that the Internet had shifted the terrain of struggle onto the global stage. Apparently new forms of protest have gone global, eclipsing national protests and identities.

The anti-MAI and Zapatista struggles are often interpreted as cases of bottom-up globalization, and the Internet is portrayed as forming the basis for a new global civil society (GCS).[12] These interpretations misleadingly emphasize qualitative breaks from the past. The two struggles may have burst onto the viewfinder of media outlets and intellectuals, but that should not eclipse their bases in well-developed, pre-existing social movements. The roots of national and local resistance to policies associated with globalism, especially in regards to austerity measures, date from 1976. These reactions were widespread from then to the end of the 1980s in Africa, Latin America, South Asia, and other areas and based on the urban poor and unions.[13] Does the language of GCS obscure struggles for popular sovereignty and resource control at the level of nations and states? Even with the space-time compression facilitated by new information technologies, how can a global civil society emerge with a unitary vision among multi-cultured, multi-tongued peoples, divided by miles of space and oceans of inequality? We investigate both the quality and limitations of cross

border solidarities. Common feelings about the injustice of globalism are not a sufficient condition for the mobilization of diverse peoples. Other prerequisites for collective action include deep feelings of shared identity and solidarity needed to form positive project identities and shared "agency frames," and the belief that sustained collective contention will bring results.[14] An obsession with GCS draws attention away from continuities with economic nationalist traditions and networks.

Objections may be raised about the validity of comparing indigenous insurgents resisting a military siege with the struggles of well-fed Canadian nationalists. Differences and power imbalances between the cases are great. Still, both involved struggles for sovereignty, bottom-up democracy, and resistance to U.S. resource colonization, and corporate rights clauses in international agreements. Both exemplify the difficulties and opportunities for building cross-national networks against global economic power. Their comparison also tests the explanatory power of the global civil society and Internet theses in forging transnational solidarity. Before turning to our cases, we need to explore the roots of these standard academic interpretations.

New actors within global civil society?

Whether the recent intensification of links across borders is greater than the socialist international solidarities of the 1890s to mid-1970s is an issue for historians to settle. Our concern is how to conceptualize the recent intensification. Do we follow the lazy route, take ready-made concepts like civil society used to understand politics at nation and state levels, transpose them to the global level and wish away the existence of actual nations and states? Or do we need subtler conceptualizations of beyond-the-nation solidarity links? Where are solidarities created, what do they look like, and what are their limitations in opposing globalism?

Charles Tilly has argued that social movements are best conceptualized not as coherent groups of people, but as sustained interactions between specific authorities and those who challenge their authority.[15] Because this interaction is so critical to contestation, changes in the locus of power alter the nature of how protest is organized, its forms, and the collective identities of the protestors. When power shifted from local communities to national politics in the 1800s, new actors were

thrown up in national contentions against the changed power structure. The dominant discourse on globalisation hypothesizes that a similar shift is occurring today, this time with power shifting from national to transnational levels, and effective resistance coming from global civil society. If this view is correct, we might expect new social actors and new repertoires of protest to replace or eclipse national ones.

Goodman terms the dominant globalization discourse "globalist adaptation," and traces its cosmopolitan roots to liberal internationalism.[16] According to these cosmopolitan perspectives, state power retracts as sovereignty leaks up to transnational institutions and down to the local.[17] As Beck writes, "[g]lobalisation – however the word is understood – implies the weakening of state sovereignty and state structures." In contrast to modernity's first stage – where solidarity was limited to the enclosed space of the nation state – identities are reformulated beyond state boundaries, embedded in "intersecting transnational loyalties." The cosmopolitan project "contradicts and replaces the nation-state project," implying a shift in conflict from capital-labor toward cosmopolitan movements and counter-movements. Beck sees possibilities not in national movements, but in new political subjects, which he alludes to as "movements and parties of world citizens."[18] As states lose sovereignty, democratic resistance is depicted as either local or transnational. "Globalization from below"[19] is understood as diverse efforts to moderate capitalist logic and implement substantive democracy. Citizen struggles shift from political parties and elections, toward cosmopolitan identities and movement politics built around global networks.[20] The Internet is seen to help build new, non-territorial, non-national forms of community in the time-compressed space created by globalization.[21]

Cosmopolitan perspectives tend to involve more normative assertions than empirical answers.[22] Terms such as global civil society, transnational social movements, and "globalization from below" have positive associations, but are frequently left ill defined and sociologically underdeveloped. Part of the problem is that civil society itself is a highly contested concept within the context of the domestic state.[23] In John Locke's conceptualization, civil society is imagined as a sphere independent of the state and centrally located in the market – a view that justified private property rights.[24] Once these rights were won in the West, the concept fell into disuse. It was revived in Eastern Europe in the 1970s and 1980s in democratic struggles to create a sphere

independent of totalitarian states. But once communism fell, the concept was wielded in Eastern Europe by advocates of capitalism rather than of democracy.[25] For liberals of both eras, the main conflicts are between state and civil society. The state must be limited because civil society embodies superior values of individual freedom. In contrast to liberal-pluralists who tend to see transnational actors as unambiguous democrats and downplay inequality, Marxists and Gramscians view civil society as the contested space of class relations and production.[26] Since the main conflicts are within civil society, buttressing GCS to combat transnational corporations is nonsensical. Marxists agree with liberals that capitalists are dominant in GCS and have been aided by globalism, but advocate empowering popular and working class elements in civil society, not an undifferentiated GCS.

The concept of domestic civil society is ambiguous enough. Globalizing the idea creates more confusion. What state or power structure is GCS supposed to be independent from? How can most people be global citizens when there are no democratic structures above the level of countries conducive to their participation? Since there has been little concrete analysis of GCS's agents, it seems important to: (a) examine actual agents of social change, assess the kinds of solidarities that are emerging across national boundaries, and study where conflicts arise, instead of assuming an idyllic landscape of global civil society. (b) examine struggles to re-embed democratic power within states, rather than dismissing states as necessarily serving transnational capital, and assuming that effective contention is primarily post-national.

The post-1945 era saw the creation of many international governing institutions. International agreements such as NAFTA, the power of international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund are notable examples. Such institutions have taken on important powers, some of them constitution-like, that crucially affect citizens' lives.[27] They have become symbols of power, and for many, they are symbols of oppressive power. It is not surprising to see contentious politics directed against them, or observe that movements and organizations have added a supranational level to their strategies.[28] Yet instead of dislodging nation and state as central loci of contentious politics, we contend that the national has remained an important bridge between locally and transnationally coordinated action.[29] What is often forgotten is that within transnational institutions, many decisions are still made by states, or at least by states that have a lot of power. States have decisive power before investment or trade

agreements are signed and less afterward. States can also collectively decide to alter course. It's an empirical question as to how much power has shifted to supranational bodies.

More pertinent to our inquiry is whether such shifts have produced as profound changes in the nature of contentious politics from below, as advocates of global civil society frequently contend. In 1984, before much of the recent transborder networking had gathered steam, Charles Tilly wrote that "national social movements occupy a position of privilege, shaping other social movements more than other movements shape them.[30] But is this still the case? The case of the European Union is instructive. The European Common Market evolved into the European Union and member countries' constitutions and laws are superseded by the EU. If transnational contentious politics is emerging, one would expect the EU to lead the way. We do not make predictions about the future, but rely instead on the more solid ground of studying what has happened. Imig and Tarrow measured 19,330 protest events in the EU from 1983 to 1995 and found a growing number that were European in character. However, European contentions constituted an "extremely small share of the total amount" – 4.1 percent. They conclude that:

> To date, however, the preponderance of contentious events in Europe appears to continue to reside where they have been for the last two hundred years – in the nation state even when the impetus for making claims lies in Brussels or further afield.[31]

Other cases where campaigns and organizations are thought to have most escaped national enclosures include the anti-apartheid movement, Greenpeace, and Amnesty International. Yet when Christian Lahusen compared these three movements, his conclusion about them was that "[s]ocial movement action above the level of the nation-state is still organized and coordinated to a greater degree between national entities than across them and is therefore rather international than transnational in character."[32] We could speculate that such movements may take on a more transnational character in the future, but this is not certain, and we want to avoid both futurology and teleology. What does seem clear is the difficulty of creating solidarity beyond primary interactions. Because of this difficulty, nationalist projects must create imagined communities of solidarity across wide expanses.[33] Solidarity *beyond* national boundaries is not new (e.g., diaspora politics and pannationalisms), but it is unclear how effectively transnational or global projects can create alternative imagined communities of solidarity.

Despite the homogenizing force of global capital,[34] cultural diversities present obstacles for a common understanding, or shared identities. Most people, especially in the majority world, are rooted in place, and have no access to telephones, never mind the Internet. Many communities are connected only through uni-directional corporate media. Although the world economy links people to distant others through commodity chains, these relations are invisible and embedded in hierarchies of class, gender, and race.

This suggests that constructing a global solidarity is an enormously ambitious undertaking. Such a project must address inequities of wealth, create democratic structures to enable mass participation across national boundaries,[35] and develop global media with a diversity of views to stimulate common debates. Wealth redistribution and information exchange would need to cross the North-South divide and involve many members from every continent. In a truly *global* civil society, non-state actors from around the world would regularly interact (with both state and non-state actors), and share understandings of substantive issues.[36]

"Transnational"[37] is a less ambitious concept than "global" and refers to organizations or movements that operate across nations, without necessarily superseding the national. Transnational implies "regular interactions across national boundaries when at least one actor is a non-state agent or does not operate on behalf of a national government or an intergovernmental organization."[38] Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink make a crucial distinction between transnational social movements (TSMs) and "transnational advocacy networks" (TANs).[39] A TSM is usually built on concrete networks of shared locality, experiences, or kinship; its key resource is its capacity for mass mobilizing. Tarrow argues that in a TSM, "challengers need to be rooted in domestic social networks *and* connected to each other more than episodically; common ways of seeing the world; contentious in action as well as words."[40]

In contrast to TSMs, transnational advocacy networks involve a small number of morally motivated activists, and do not usually engage in mass mobilizations. They are a "set of relevant organizations working internationally with shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information."[41] The goal of TANs is not just to influence outcomes, but to change the terms of the debate, substituting unacceptable positions with more inclusive, democratic normative struc-

tures. While TANs may operate across vast territorial divides, they can be thought of as political spaces where meanings, norms, and frames are negotiated. They are both structures and agents, and have grown substantially in the last three decades.[42]

A TAN cannot be subsumed into notions of global civil society or transnational social movements. It is a precise concept that clarifies the agency question. Keck and Sikkink conclude that "however much we are seeing the increasing interpenetration of domestic and international politics, transposing sets of categories from one to the other seems unlikely to make sense of the simultaneity of both." In studying TANs, Keck and Sikkink found little evidence of transnational social movements, but discovered that repressive regimes in Latin America spurred the transnationalization of advocacy networks by externalizing domestic rights struggles, forcing activists to go abroad to gain influential allies to pressure the offending state from the outside.[43] They call this the "boomerang effect." While many actors in TANs have been involved in social movements, these networks are not themselves transnational social movements. TANs are more ephemeral and mobile and represent ideas rather than constituencies.[44] They are communicative structures for political exchange, and their main currency is information, a weapon of the weak.

It is also important to distinguish TSMs and TANs from nationally focused struggles, and from the transnational coordination of nationally focussed contentions. Hype about power drifting away from nations obscures ongoing struggles to re-embed democratic control at national levels, where the capacity to mass mobilize is greater than at the transnational level.[45] National movements are those that contend largely against national power structures, have all or most of their supporters in one country or nation, and display distinctive cultures of contention. National movement organizations may coordinate campaigns transnationally with other national organizations, but to remain national, beyond-the-nation activities cannot be the main focus of their work. Social movement action above the level of nations and states are best understood as loosely coordinated transnationally, but nationally-rooted and directed.

In practice there are hybrids of national and transnational movements regarding issues, targets, mobilization, and organization. While any typology is an approximation of complex realities, a well-crafted typology can help us make better sense of complexity. We believe it is

important to distinguish between national and transnational because of the ubiquitous assumption that transnational movements have replaced national organizations, and concomitantly, that beyond-the-nation coordination is sufficient to make a campaign transnational, or to comprise a transnational social movement. According to our criteria, a TSM requires regular, long-term interaction across nations, and the presence of common frames and shared norms across national boundaries. Consensus formation across national movements takes a long time and can be said to be transnational only once formulations are put in more universal language.[46] If, on the other hand, the framing of issues remains different, mass mobilizations and organizations stay separate and targets distinct, we are dealing with movements that are primarily national. These distinctions enable us to evaluate claims about GCS and investigate where the action took place in our case studies. At what levels were solidarities created? Was a genuine GCS being formed? Were these transnational social movements, TAN's or national movements? We turn to our cases for answers.

The MAI fails at the OECD

Most theorizing about social movements and transnationalization was done before the recent anti-globalization protests. On the basis of other movements, Rucht and Tarrow argue that transnational collective action tends toward cooptation and deradicalization.[47] Yet so far, anti-globalism protesters have shown few signs of compromise. This could be because opponents' root-and-branch critiques of globalism cut to the core of the global elite's class interests.

"We are writing the constitution of a single global economy," boasted Renato Ruggerio, Director General of the WTO.[48] Despite setbacks at the WTO in 1996, at the OECD with the MAI in 1998, and in the 1999 WTO battle in Seattle, much of Ruggiero's global capitalist constitution is already in place. Other pieces are being negotiated. While the MAI's demise, the first major reversal for globalism in the North, was largely due to popular opposition, the latter's strength should not be exaggerated. William Dymond, Canada's chief MAI negotiator, correctly notes that "by any measure [the MAI's] penetration of public consciousness paled compared to the free trade debate in the 1980s." The fatal weakness of negotiating a MAI at the OECD, he argues, was the success of previous neo-liberal agreements. There were already so few investment barriers among its members, that negotiators could not effectively mobilize MAI supporters to combat the critics.[49]

Instead of hiding corporate rights behind the popular "free trade" label, the MAI was the first self-proclaimed "investment agreement," a twin to the WTO's "framework for trade." Initially written by the International Chamber of Commerce,[50] the MAI defined the rules by which signatory governments must standardize policies, treat foreign corporations and capital, and set up a dispute settlement mechanism allowing corporations to sue governments directly before secret international tribunals.[51] The expropriation and compensation rules would have empowered foreign corporations to challenge state policies – from taxes, to environmental issues, labor rules, distinct cultural policies and consumer protection – that potentially threatened profits.[52] Proposals to codify investors' rights were defeated at the Uruguay round of GATT (1986-1994) that established the WTO. The South, where corporate rights are widely seen as recolonization, voted down an agreement similar to the MAI at the WTO First Ministerial Meeting in Singapore in 1996. To get around what they saw as Southern obstinacy, U.S. officials insisted on switching to the OECD, the "rich men's club," to get a "high standards" agreement and then impose it on the South.[53]

However, the framers' dreams were crushed again. NGOs objected to property rights taking enforceable precedence over existing international norms on social, environmental, labor, cultural, human, and indigenous rights.[54] By boldly stepping on so many toes, the proposed MAI provoked broad opposition among often previously unconnected citizens organizations. According to James Goodman, five factors stand out in the MAI's failure at the OECD: 1) The broad scope of the MAI created many enemies and laid the basis for powerful cross-sectoral alliances. 2) The OECD was weakly legitimated. 3) NGO's constructed powerful linkages between local and national concerns, by mobilizing sub-national opinion. 4) Presaging the Battle in Seattle, the anti-MAI campaign symbolized a general revolt against globalism as much as against this single agreement. 5) The anti-MAI network created alliances across the OECD/South divide. To defeat the MAI, opponents needed to prevent the South's isolation and mobilize in the North. These goals were met in ways that contradict assertions about the eclipse of "nation-states." Word on secret MAI talks flowed from Southern governments to Southern NGOs, who then told Northern NGOs. The latter then mobilized against their own governments.

In most global civil society literature, states are depicted as enemies of bottom-up globalization. It is no surprise then that state diplomacy

was downplayed in the MAI's fall. But, oblivious to theorizing, movements target states because they remain central actors in international negotiations.[55] As national anti-MAI campaigns accelerated and "surprised and disconcerted political leaders," a fascinating cycle emerged. Countries listed exemptions from the MAI, thereby encouraging citizens to press harder, and in some cases leading to more exemptions. When France quit the talks in October 1998 and Canada followed suit, there were so many exemptions that MAI supporters found the whole rationale of the agreement undermined.[56] The MAI was dead.

We know of no comprehensive account of MAI campaigns in the seventeen or eighteen OECD countries where popular opposition was significant.[57] Our account focuses on Canada, where we interviewed key activists. This is supplemented by interviews with non-Canadians and use of secondary sources, including Internet sites, on campaigns in France, Australia, the United States, Germany, the European Parliament, and the Third World Network.

The heroic portrayal of global civil society, transnational links, and the secret text

Governments, the media and academics portrayed GCS and the Internet as the anti-MAI heroes. France's Lalumière Report stated: "[f]or the first time, we are witnessing the emergence of a '*global civil society*.' … *The development of the Internet* … allows for the instantaneous distribution of texts under discussion … and for the sharing of knowledge and expertise across borders."[58] "How the Internet killed the MAI," read the front-page headline in the Toronto-based *Globe and Mail*. The story circulated so widely in the anti-MAI network, that John Cavanagh in Washington received it from over 100 sources; it drowned his computer.[59] The *Financial Times* stressed the "fear and bewilderment [that] have seized governments and industrialised countries" after they were "ambushed" by the [anti-MAI] "horde" that used the Internet as its decisive weapon.[60] Writing with greater nuance, academics have similarly discussed the Internet in the MAI's defeat. Peter J. Smith and Elizabeth Smythe make claims typical of GCS proponents:

> The flip side of economic globalization is political globalization and mobilization, both made possible by the information revolution. As Higgot and Reich argue, "we are not going to have a global information economy without a global civil society."

Through e-mail, listservs, and news groups, the Internet is seen to have *created* a network of activists.[61] But questions remain. Did citizens self-organize simultaneously as transnational social movements, TANs, and nationally-based movements? What was the role of the Internet? Did discourses shift from country to country or was there a common "master frame"?[62] Did citizen groups operate independently of states and political parties, or were there frequent interactions? To answer these questions and evaluate claims about GCS and the Internet in defeating the MAI, we explore key events in the struggle: the discovery of the secret text, early opposition at the OECD meetings, and the ways anti-MAI activists organized, coordinated, and mobilized.

International coordination of opposition did not spontaneously materialize. When opponents issued a Joint NGO Statement on October 27, 1997 in Paris where they met MAI negotiators, they built on pre-existing TANs. The most important of these was the International Forum on Globalization (IFG), formed in January 1994. Sixty-five veterans of nationally-based, anti-free trade campaigns initiated the IFG, a U.S. organization with 60 percent of its 60 associates and board members based in the United States and over 80 percent in the North.[63] Despite its Northern preponderance, the IFG linked leading Northern activists with leaders of the South such as Martin Khor, head of the Third World Network based in Malaysia, and Vandana Shiva, Indian author and ecological activist. The IFG also provided key contacts among country-based MAI campaigns in OECD countries, and coordinated efforts led by Tony Clarke of Canada, and Lori Wallach, of Public Citizen Global Trade Watch in Washington. In the United States and Canada, the IFG held international Teach-Ins,[64] activist workshops, coordinated activities, and shared information about impending moves to implement another piece of the global capitalist constitution. The IFG met often by teleconferencing and closed Internet links to strategize international opposition to the MAI, and helped plan the 1999 battle in Seattle. Key constituent organizations within the IFG include *Public Citizen*, led by Ralph Nader, and The *Council of Canadians*, the 100,000-member veteran of nationalist battles against the FTA and NAFTA. Their memberships and campaigns are nationally oriented. Acting for the IFG, they supplied much of the organizational muscle, leadership, and expertise to wage effective opposition to the MAI.

Forging North-South links was key to finding the secret MAI text. In the fall of 1996, Martin Khor warned his IFG colleagues about secret

talks on the MAI already underway at the OECD. Unlike anti-globalism groups in the North who are distant from their own governments, the Third World Network (TWN) meets regularly with sympathetic Southern governments. Prior to the December 1996 WTO meetings, the TWN briefed WTO representatives from more than a dozen Southern countries on the WTO investment proposals at a two-day workshop.[65] As parties to international negotiations, friendly governments share information with the TWN, which in turn informs its Northern activist allies. It was through this state-TAN exchange that Northern activists discovered what their own governments were secretly negotiating.

How did Canadian activists find the MAI text? According to Clarke, after Khor's warnings some IFG members decided they could do little without the text. Clarke agreed to lead the search in Canada, spoke to Canadian anti-free trade veterans, and sent out feelers to friendly contacts inside government and parties, particularly the New Democratic Party (NDP, Canada's social democratic party). In late February 1997, Clarke got the draft text through a Canadian Member of Parliament, who accidentally came across it at a meeting in Europe.[66] *Public Citizen,* other U.S. groups, and a few European activists looked for, but never found the text. Instead of releasing the text right away, Clarke and Barlow shared it with *Public Citizen* and both groups analyzed it separately. Clarke framed the MAI as a "Corporate Rule Treaty," so activists could make a compelling case and the public understand its implications. The strategy worked. Clarke's analysis was front-page news in the *Globe and Mail* on April 3, 1997. *Public Citizen* and the *Multinational Monitor* in Washington put the draft text on their websites for worldwide distribution a few days later.

Why Canadian leadership against the MAI?

If the Internet and GCS are anti-globalism heroes, we would expect MAI opposition in the OECD to have come mainly from the United States and Western Europe. Traditionally, most activist initiatives in the North have come from those places. However, leadership came most strongly from Canada, organized by existing economic nationalist circles, not new cosmopolitan ones. This suggests historical continuity, rather than a rupture from past modes of organizing.

The MAI made a big splash in the Canadian media. Only in France and perhaps Australia, was public consciousness of the MAI at any-

where near a comparable level. Although not a major campaign issue, the MAI was raised critically by Alexa McDonough, leader of the NDP in the English-language television debate in Canada's June 1997 federal election. CBC Radio did a series on the MAI, and the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) sent two television crews to cover Barlow and the MAI opponents meetings in Paris in October 1997; no other country sent an international television crew. Barlow attributes media attention in Canada to three factors. *First*, a politically literate public had been won over to opposing the FTA and NAFTA in the previous 12 years. *Second*, the CBC had their own concerns about the MAI's threat to culture and public broadcasting. *Third*, when opposition was building, the Ethyl case broke in the summer of 1998, showing Canadians the sweeping implications of investor-state mechanisms.[67]

The Ethyl Corporation used NAFTA's Chapter 11 (the expropriation and compensation protocols copied in the MAI) to attack Canadian legislation banning MMT, a gasoline additive that Canada deemed "an insidious neurotoxin." Canada capitulated out-of-court, paid Ethyl $19.3 million (Cdn) for "lost profits," lifted the ban on MMT, and Prime Minister Chretien publicly repudiated his statement about the "horrific effects" of MMT.[68] Until the MMT case, critics had had trouble convincing Environment Ministers and other potential allies that Chapter 11 type clauses in a MAI would pose more than a hypothetical threat. But when Canadian activists took the MMT case to OECD negotiators, it "was like a brushfire in Europe." "They said it can never happen. We said it can and did happen and here is the prototype."[69]

Why did the MAI struggle evoke more resonance in Canada than elsewhere? It was not that Canadians released the document first, Clarke contends, but that Canada was the first country to have been exposed to the investor-state mechanism in the FTA and NAFTA. Many knew what it could do to the public sector. Canadian activists retold that experience again and again to Europeans who did not believe that their strong public sectors could be touched, and did not understand the profound effects of applying American property law internationally.[70]

The extent of Canadian leadership could be seen in the Canadian domination of Internet sites, and the prominence of Canadian activists in the anti-MAI campaign. Smythe and Smith examined the 400 websites focussing on the MAI in the English, French, German, and Spanish

languages. While the OECD had the most website links, the next four were Canadian.[71] Six of the top twelve sites were Canadian, all opposing the MAI. Ralph Nader called the MAI opposition "another Canadian first."[72] Clarke brought ninety activists from many countries to an International Symposium at Port Elgin Ontario one week after the NGO meetings in Paris; these participants were key to building country-based campaigns several months later.[73] Clarke and Barlow wrote the first book on the MAI, which was released at the opponents meetings in Paris in October 1997. They wrote the only American book, changing the sub-title to "the threat to American freedom," from "the threat to Canadian sovereignty," sovereignty apparently not being a major concern of a hegemonic power. Maria Mies, leader of Germany's "Resistance Against the MAI," said that the German and Austrian campaigns were "practically initiated" by Canadians. In Austria, Claudia Werlhof took the Canadian materials, organized a conference at Innsbruck University, and copied the Canadian tactic of asking local governments to declare MAI "free zones." The German campaign translated Clarke's analysis, but as in the United States, the issue framing did not fit. The reaction Mies got from Left and feminist friends was "what do you mean by national sovereignty?" "When you raise the nation-state in Germany, you are put in a right-wing corner."[74] Janace Moira Graham wrote "New Zealanders are talking about the tremendous fight Canadians are putting up against the MAI every day on national talk back radio and on our newsgroups…. Here's smiling at you, Canada."[75] Although the network relied on the MAI as a common enemy and agreed on corporate rule as a master frame, different national contexts led to different ways to frame the issues.

Strategic shift to country-based opposition

Even before the IFG searched for the MAI text, moderate international NGOs, including the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) and Friends of the Earth, formed an international lobbying network to secure a reformed MAI.[76] But the OECD, which had never negotiated a treaty, did not engage with the moderate network, to avoid placing even mild obligations on investors. In October 1997, six months after the text became public and MAI activism was mounting, the OECD backtracked and invited the moderates to Paris. It proved too late to coopt. Radical anti-globalism activists from Southern and OECD countries joined the moderates. Everyone at the NGO meetings agreed

to act in solidarity no matter which position won among the 70 or so individuals at the counter-MAI meetings. A moderate statement advising a revised MAI with an environmental exemption was pitted against *Public Citizen*'s rejectionist statement. The latter won and became the "Joint NGO Statement." By February 1998, it was endorsed in over 70 countries by over 600 citizens groups, including those in development, human rights, labor, environment, and consumer groups in Southern and OECD countries.

Did the Joint NGO campaign represent an emerging transnational civil society movement, a TAN, or nationally-based movements that episodically coordinated transnationally? The main goal of the Joint Statement was to pressure governments. All signatory organizations are listed by country, and few are organized significantly beyond their borders. Citizens groups had self-organized by nation and state, not globally or even continentally. Nor was the Joint Statement's discourse global or transnational. "The MAI does not respect the right of countries … to democratically control investment into their economies." This is hardly a rallying cry for an emerging GCS. "Problems with the MAI," the statement adds, "stem from the broad restrictions it places on national democratic action." The network's main objection was the weakening of national sovereignty.[77]

After the OECD rebuff of NGO demands for a one-year moratorium on negotiations, activists promised to return home to organize. Significant opposition emerged in seventeen or eighteen of the twenty-nine OECD countries, but not without prodding. According to Clarke, several NGOs that organized the Paris counter-MAI meetings did not think beyond their own privileged role, and had absolutely no relationship to an authentic constituency, nor the ability to mass mobilize. To rectify the lack of roots, the IFG strategy concentrated on nationally-rooted country campaigns rather than attempting to build a transnational social movement. Lori Wallach of *Public Citizen,* and Clarke, both acting for the IFG, visited European and other OECD countries in January 1998 to initiate broad coalitions, country by country. As veterans of NAFTA opposition, they knew that multi-sectoral, on-the-ground campaigns were needed in as many OECD countries as possible. As Clarke put it:

> As time went on in 1998, you could see what had started out to be something organized by international NGOs to begin with, as some form of opposition, was gradually finding itself losing ground to the country-based campaigns.

> Why? That's where the real strength was. The resistance that was building to the MAI, as it went through stage by stage, was coming from the countries sitting at the table.[78]

Country campaigns and divergent discourses

Which countries mounted the most successful campaigns and why? Were repertoires new transnational ones or national standbys? Did action revolve mostly around new or existing social movements? Were interactions with governments and political parties central?

The MAI issue never took off in the United States. In contrast to the Battle of Seattle a year later, it did not penetrate the media much, or spark much movement politics. The action was in faraway Paris. To the extent that there was public consciousness, much of it was due to the work of Canadians, Clarke and Barlow, which included their MAI book,[79] Barlow's CNN interview, and some major talk shows. However two major U.S. successes bolstered the opposition cause. Both were due as much to governments, legislators, and academics as to movements. The first came in April 1997, the month the secret text was "outed." Bill Clinton lost "fast track" authority that would have given him the power to negotiate international agreements subject only to a yes or no vote by Congress. The MAI was only a minor factor in the effective lobbying of Congress to deny fast track by a broad anti-NAFTA coalition and environmentalists.[80] Clinton's loss hurt the Administration's maneuverability at the MAI talks. The second coup came from an unlikely quarter. Governors of western states, mostly Republicans, claimed that the MAI would restrict sub-national governments, including U.S. states. The U.S. opponents' main contribution to the MAI's defeat was in organizational, strategic, and other information transfers to other country campaigns.

Things were very different in Canada where there had been very broad anti-FTA and anti-NAFTA coalitions, particularly in English-speaking Canada. The idea of a corporate rule treaty was readily grasped. Elizabeth May, head of the Sierra Club of Canada, recounted how the issue quickly took off in Canada:

> What was phenomenal about the MAI campaign was that it spread so quickly to the grassroots level…. It was spreading like wildfire…. We couldn't have created that campaign by planning. The key factor for environmental groups was the Ethyl Corporation: their threat to use chapter 11 [the investment chapter in NAFTA].[81]

Anti-MAI coalitions in Canada included environmentalists, social justice activists in the Catholic and major Protestant Churches, economic nationalists, much of the cultural community, and the National Action Committee on the Status of Women (NAC), the main umbrella group of women's organizations. In contrast to most union federations in other OECD countries, the major Canadian unions, including the Canadian Labor Congress, united against the MAI.[82] Canadian actions showed much variety in the 18-month campaign. At the IFG International Teach-In organized by the Council of Canadians in November 1997, two-thousand mainly young people "raised the roof" off the University of Toronto's Convocation Hall. Citizens' inquiries were held in most major cities, inviting public submissions and attracting hundreds to each site. Constituent groups in the coalition wrote their own members about the MAI, and mobilized internally. The Sierra Club of Canada, for instance, briefed the New Democrat federal caucus and met many backbench Members of Parliament in the other parties. They organized letter writing campaigns and their youth wing held a MAI day of action across Canada. There was street theatre and a nearly full-page ad in the *Globe and Mail*. Barry Appleton, a top international trade lawyer from Toronto, wrote a legal opinion for the *Council of Canadians*.[83] His list of vulnerable environmental issues under the MAI had a tremendous impact internationally, and helped spur France to quit the negotiations. In the only major street protest in Canada, Operation "SalAMI"[84] brought hundreds to barricade the Sheraton Hotel in Montreal in May 1998 where a conference featured Donald Johnston, OECD's Director-General, and ninety-nine people were arrested.

Canadian activists targeted sub-national governments. Although not party to the talks, they would have been subject to the MAI. The NDP government of the province of British Columbia held a parliamentary inquiry on the MAI and issued a critical report. Three provinces and several municipalities opposed the MAI. A federal parliamentary committee on the MAI took briefs from citizens, most of whom opposed it. Taken together, these multi-faceted campaigns shifted Canada's position from being "gung-ho, cowboy crazy about getting the MAI through,"[85] Clarke said, to laying out exemptions on health, social and educational services, aboriginals, culture, and agricultural supply management.

In France, opponents of the "AMI" formed a coalition of seventy associations, but largely worked separately from each other. Opposition

came from the cultural community, environmentalists, the CGT union federation and the Communist Party, which was a junior partner in the Socialist government. Jacques Lang, the Culture Minister who coined the phrase, "L'AMI, c'est l'enemi,"[86] played a prominent role. The sum of oppositions built to the point where France pulled out of the MAI talks in October 1998, one year after the meeting between NGOs and the OECD. The strongest resistance came from the cultural community, which has long contested Americanization. At the Cesar's, France's academy awards with millions of television viewers, the emcee, who was part of the anti-MAI coalition, condemned the MAI. She got prolonged applause.[87] A French collective against clones of the MAI, led by Susan George in Paris, supported the right of each country to subsidize diverse cultural expressions and opposed applying the "national treatment" clause to other countries' cultures.[88]

The Australian campaign started late (January 1998), but mounted perhaps the third strongest campaign amongst OECD countries. Significantly, the spark came not from citizens' movements, but from a radio documentary in November 1997 by ABC, the public broadcaster, which played a similar role to the Canadian CBC in popularizing the issue. In English-Canada, anti-MAI campaigners could credibly combine left nationalism with international solidarity, because right populists supported the MAI and were ready to concede sovereignty to the United States.[89] In contrast, Australian campaigners waged an anti-nationalist discourse because, initially the national media associated MAI opposition with Pauline Hanson, "One Nation" and xenophobic nationalism.[90] To counter the establishment's portrayal of globalization as the only alternative to xenophobic nationalism, MAI opponents gained credibility by promoting a "globalization" that served people not corporations.[91] Campaigns developed most strongly at the Australian state and local levels, with weak national coordination.

For theorists of global civil society, globalization implies a shift from traditional politics centered on political parties and states, to movement politics focussed on global networks opposing transnational corporate power. Despite the anti-nationalist discourse, Australian movements worked closely with federal and state political institutions and parties. A Green Party Senator first raised the MAI issue, in March 1997, ten months before citizens' campaigns began. As elsewhere, opponents exploited divisions between the Department of Trade, which led the secretive OECD talks, and other departments that were left in the dark. The campaigns also benefited from party divisions. The Demo-

crats and Greens, minor parties with members in federal and state legislatures, sided with MAI opponents. Labor, the main opposition party, was divided, but in March 1998 joined the minor parties in widening the scope of a parliamentary inquiry, which gave critics a public forum, and ultimately advised against signing the MAI without a thorough assessment of Australia's interests.[92]

The Austrian campaign had a very parliamentary focus. Foes got the Salzburg and Frauburg parliaments to oppose the MAI. The Finance Minister supported the MAI and the Environment Minister opposed it. The Prime Minister broke the deadlock by siding with the Environment Minister.[93] German opposition was small, fairly narrowly based, and dependent on external information, but also had a strong parliamentary focus.[94] It consisted of WEED,[95] Germanwatch, Mies' *Committee of Resistance against the MAI,* university student groups, and individuals in feminist and environmental movements. German opponents began work shortly after the October 1997 Paris meetings. They held a media workshop on the MAI with journalists from Germany's most important newspapers, surveyed fifty NGOs in the South, and held a big congress in Bonn in April 1998.[96] They attracted officials from the federal ministries of the Environment and of economic cooperation to a seminar, but failed to persuade the Green Party, junior partners in the Schroeder government. The German campaign had more success amongst MEPs, Members of the European Parliament. Although the latter had no vote at the OECD talks, the adoption (by a vote of 437 to 8) of a critical report authored by German Green MEP, Wolfgang Kreissl-Dörfler, was an important early blow to the MAI talks. The Green Group of MEPs was a leader in fighting the MAI.[97]

In this section, we have seen that anti-MAI campaigns were most effective when they focussed on their own governments. The country-based strategy was successful because, when pressed, governments sometimes listen to their own citizens. Transnational publics do not elect the governments. The fact that states make decisions at the OECD increased the salience of national mobilizations. However, the country campaigns were greatly enhanced by the transnational sharing of information and the strategic leadership of individuals like Clarke and Wallach. Their critical role was not as leaders of global civil society, but as key individuals within transnational advocacy networks that catalyzed and supported national movements.

Was there a unifying transnational frame using universal language, or did frames remain national? What role did the Internet play? As we saw, the Joint NGO Statement objected to the MAI's attempt to regulate governments rather than corporations. France decried the absence of an acknowledged cultural exemption and above all, the threat to national sovereignty: "The agreement has become a symbol. It crystallizes civil society's objections to and frustrations with globalization. There is one central reason for this: the agreement is perceived as a serious threat to national sovereignty."[98] U.S. insistence on its exceptionalism – its many exemptions and the application of its laws extraterritorially – sparked national resistance in other OECD states.[99] Canadian leadership in organizing against the MAI came largely from the Council of Canadians, a self-proclaimed [English-Canadian] nationalist organization, and its dominant frames were national sovereignty and opposing corporate rule. Overall, national themes tended to trump transnational ones.

However, TAN leaders searched for transnational master frames. In workshops with activists in each country, Clarke and Wallach discussed how best to present the MAI issues.[100] The theme of *corporate rule* became a master frame spanning the various campaigns, but *national sovereignty* was less successful as a universal theme. The latter struck a discordant note in Australia, and some European countries, especially Germany, with its Nazi past. After consulting with Maria Mies and others in Germany, Clarke substituted *popular sovereignty* for *national sovereignty* and the former became a general formulation for activists. Clarke explains his view of popular sovereignty:

> When we talk about "sovereignty," we do not mean "national sovereignty" per se. Instead, we are talking, first and foremost, about the fundamental democratic rights of people – The Universal Declaration of Human Rights – which calls for the recognition of the fundamental rights of all people to food, clothing and shelter, employment, education, and healthcare, clean environment, cultural integrity and quality public services, plus fair wages and working conditions – is really a declaration about "popular sovereignty." It is this "popular sovereignty" that is the foundation stone of democracy itself, which is directly threatened by the MAI as a "corporate rule" treaty.[101]

According to Barlow, a new anti-globalization activist is emerging from human rights, feminist, ecological and labor movements and can no longer be identified from their brand of activist roots. "We don't even ask each other where you come from any longer. We all have this

common analysis." A new breed of young Europeans, comments Barlow, is searching for an analysis somewhere between a nationalist position and an acceptance of globalization. The Internet was important in developing this shared discourse:

> The closest thing we have now to an international media is the Internet, and sharing this information with each other. Somebody says something here that we know would be of value to our colleagues in another country, we can get it out instantly. We lived and breathed on that thing.

While this discourse may have flowed along transnational lines of electronic communication, it grew out of the network of established activists who knew each other. Anti-MAI leaders met face-to-face before they used the Internet. "We learned to care about each other as human beings. We built that trust up and there is nothing to take its place. Once you've got it, then you can use your technology in a very specific way." In short, Barlow disagrees with the idea that the Internet killed the MAI: "[w]e killed it using the Internet as a tool." The small number of leaders had a private listserv to ask tough questions and share information, but instituted control measures to limit all the "junk" about the MAI on the Internet. Another indispensable tool was teleconferencing. "There is a core group of people we know, we deeply trust," Barlow concluded. "We don't want anybody we don't know and trust" to be part of the internal dialogue.[102] Thus the inner circle that coordinated national campaigns used the Internet as an instantaneous, but internal communications system to consolidate activist networks.

Key normative issues emerged as flashpoints for transnational solidarity: democracy, popular sovereignty, control over natural resources, human rights, and the environment. The Internet facilitated their shared understanding. But the neglected side of the MAI story was the interaction between nationally organized citizens groups and their own governments. In conjunction with movements in the South, citizens mobilized in a majority of OECD countries to push their governments for exemptions. Finally France's Socialist government, pressed by its Communist ally, quit the talks. It was historical continuity that led Canadian nationalists, who long contested U.S. domination and experienced the first corporate rule treaty in the FTA, to initiate the struggle and find allies in other countries. The MAI's demise was not a simple civil society story of social movement warriors defeating secretive international negotiators, but of close interactions amongst movements, governments, and political parties. It was much closer to traditional politics than the purveyors of GCS fancifully portray.

Which elements of the MAI campaigns were transnational, and which primarily national? There was little evidence of global or transnational social movements, but TANs were crucial to the MAI's defeat. The International Forum on Glolalization was a particularly successful TAN, and used the main currency of such networks: sharing information, framing issues like national and popular sovereignty, and strategizing among a small number of nationally rooted activists. Although they searched for a common master frame, they only partly succeeded. "National-sovereignty" worked very well in certain contexts, but engendered scepticism in others. It was replaced with more general notions of popular sovereignty, which never gained as wide a following as "national sovereignty" in Canada and France, the countries of strongest opposition where the MAI broke into public discourse. Everywhere national movements did the hard work of mobilizing citizens and lobbying governments. Issues were nationally defined and the primary targets were the central governments sitting at the negotiations. The citizens' MAI campaigns thus confirm Calhoun's observation that "[t]his category of nation may be a helpful mediation between the local and the global."[103] It suggests that national projects for self-determination can forge strong ties with movements in other nations. Although circumstances differed greatly, this conclusion was also evident in the Zapatista struggle.

Zapatismo: Building an International of Hope

> We propose an International of Hope, Struggle, Solidarity and Co-operation. Never has it been as difficult for a people to liberate itself, and that is why the international struggle is so important. Nonetheless, the base of the change has to be the struggle of each country, within its own experience and its own culture.
>
> EZLN statement from the first "intergalactic encounter," Chiapas Mexico 1996.

Zapatismo has spread far beyond the Lacandón jungle, into the hearts of distant activists resisting neo-liberal globalism. Although the eloquent writings of Subcomandante Marcos have inspired people throughout the world, the resulting solidarity linkages are less carefully identified, falling prey to both romanticized portrayals, and cynical comments about Zapatista souvenir t-shirts. What often gets lost is an analytic middle-ground investigating the shape and texture of

Zapatismo solidarity, alongside a realistic accounting of its strengths and limitations.

Documenting transnational Zapatismo is a massive undertaking. Our focus is limited to questioning the nature of Zapatismo solidarity beyond Mexico, with a special focus on the role of the Internet constituting networks of solidarity.[104] The Internet is arguably the most important tool connecting Zapatista supporters outside of Mexico, and warrants particular attention as a tool used to resist globalism.[105] Internet Zapatismo embodies the dominant metaphor of globalized capitalism, the network, on two fronts: the network of electronic Internet connections, and a social network of supporters.[106] Internet connections are not ethereal constructs, floating in the realm of cyberspace and unconnected to "real life" struggles.[107] Tools like listservs can function as broad digital nets, drawing in data on printed media sources, visual sources (film and video), grass-roots activities, political commentaries, as well as first-hand accounts of activists. Listserv e-mails often contain reprints from independent news sources – an imperfect, but important verification device.[108] But is Internet solidarity a lazy activism of e-mail petitions, or simply a convenient tool to facilitate grass-roots organizing? More broadly, does Zapatismo represent a transnational advocacy network involving a small number of committed activists, or can it more accurately be described as a transnational social movement with sustained mass mobilization in various countries over a longer period? Conclusions are drawn from reviews of Zapatismo web sites, a survey of the Chiapas95-English listserv, interviews with solidarity activists, and participant observation.[109]

Solidarity observed: Shape, form, content

It is first important to distinguish different actors involved in the Zapatista struggle. A first group is made up of Zapatistas – the indigenous *campesinos* who live in Chiapas and explicitly support the EZLN. A second group comprises solidarity groups within Mexico. A third group, and the focus of this study, are solidarity groups outside of Mexico, recognizing the essential communication and inevitable overlap between national and transnational categories. Our survey found that Zapatismo solidarity efforts outside Mexico took on three basic forms, most of which were much more creative than e-mail petitions.

> Many people, thousands or perhaps millions, in the different countries of the continents of the Americas, Europe, Africa, Asia and Australia, people of different faiths, from different social and political organizations, found out what perverse tongues have always tried to keep hidden…. So many came to see for themselves, so many were disabused of the lies that had been published from the government's tongue. All of those embraced us and lifted us up, which explains why today we have strength to shout: because our 45 sisters and brothers died in order to live.[110]
>
> *Las Abejas* ("the Bees" agricultural cooperative), commenting on solidarity they received following the December 1997 Acteal massacre

Zapatismo political lobbying fits the category described by Keck and Sikkink as the "boomerang effect": when domestic access is blocked, activists go abroad to gain influential allies to pressure the offending state from the outside.[111] Through written communication or direct action, Zapatista activists abroad lobby OECD states to pressure the Mexican state to support the demands of Zapatistas in Chiapas. Groups gather outside courthouses, consulate offices, and legislatures to demand an end to military aid to Mexico, the implementation of the San Andrés Accords on Indigenous Rights and Culture, withdrawal of all Mexican military from Chiapas, and prosecution of paramilitaries.[112] While protests are often small and public interest waxes and wanes, such lobbying has helped prevent the Zapatista cause from fading into obscurity. Mexican president Vicente Fox has been forced to account for human rights and environmental concerns publicized by U.S. solidarity groups and representatives from various countries who continue to visit Chiapas on fact-finding missions.[113]

Human rights interventions represent the most prominent form of Zapatismo solidarity. Thousands of observers have gone to Chiapas to witness state-sanctioned militarization and paramilitary harassment. *Campamentistas* (accompaniment volunteers) spend time in threatened communities, and are trained and sponsored by the non-profit organizations *Enlace Civil* or the Fray Bartolome de las Casas human rights center. These projects have been critical to the security of threatened communities, and the expulsion of foreign activists indicates some success in exposing ongoing militarization.[114] Although low-intensity warfare and paramilitary oppression continue to this day, the Mexican military has been unwilling to launch a full-scale attack on the Zapatistas.[115] Scrutiny has come from both local human rights groups and

more distant, official channels. Mary Robinson, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, met survivors of the Acteal massacre, avoided the "official tour," and strongly denounced human rights abuses in Chiapas.[116] While the Internet itself cannot provide political accompaniment, it has quickly distributed information about who needs help and how it can be best organized.

Circulating information:
Related to human rights interventions are Zapatismo campaigns to publicize and educate core citizens about low intensity warfare and other injustices in Chiapas. This solidarity strategy takes place in the context of the changed opportunity structures and increased information flows made available through globalization processes. Much has changed since the 1968 student massacre, when the Mexican state was able to control information about "official" death tolls, and the Zapatista solidarity network is a palpable demonstration of how the Mexican state's monopoly over information has been curbed.[117] In Keck and Sikkink's words: "[a] dense web of north-south exchange, aided by computer and fax communication, means that governments can no longer monopolize information flows."[118] Getting the word out, and educating citizens in developed countries is a key goal of activists. For Wes Rehberg, of the Strategic Pastoral Action Network, solidarity efforts are important because they "keep the light of public opinion on areas of oppression that otherwise would be obscured from public view" – a matter of importance since "such efforts are welcome and invited by those at sites of resistance against such oppression."[119] Information has been a central goal since the uprising's start. In 1996, Subcomandante Marcos famously called for:

> a communications network between all of our struggles, an intercontinental network of alternative communication against neoliberalism, an intercontinental network for humanity.... This intercontinental network will not be an organized structure, it will have no moderator, central control, or any hierarchies. The network will be all of us who speak and listen.[120]

Although there are other important means of communicating about the Zapatista struggle,[121] the Internet was an obvious means to orchestrate this network. As a result of Marcos's call to communication arms, and the availability of information technologies, activists aimed to consolidate disparate electronic news sources on Zapatismo and neo-liberalism, while keeping communication structures democratic and non-hierarchical.[122] Electronic Zapatismo networks have been successful at publicizing atrocities, unconstitutional arrests, and press

reports that would otherwise be unavailable in English. Information flows daily on resistance and military harassment (e.g., the military's involvement in spraying Zapatista communities with a harmful pesticide over the last five years).[123]

Economic and anti-corporate activities:
A third means of Zapatismo solidarity involves making direct economic connections with Zapatista communities, and organizing protests against corporate exploitation of Chiapas' peoples and resources. Pastors for Peace, for example, deliver humanitarian aid from the United States to poor communities. Economic connections are often more indirect and highly creative. The Zapatista School Bond Program sells five-dollar school bonds to friends, family, teachers, and organizations; the money collected is sent to indigenous educators in Chiapas.[124] The British web-page ChiapasLink describes the range of redistributive support connections:

> While the Zapatistas have rejected government aid and development projects, there are a number of channels for supporting projects defined by the communities themselves. In Italy, for example, groups have raised money for a project to build a small environmentally friendly electricity turbine in La Realidad, and for a health project in Los Altos. Groups in the US have fundraised to support the construction of the bilingual secondary school in Oventic…. The two alternative water technology projects rely largely on donations.[125]

The Chiapas95 listserv also distributes news about corporate involvement in regional resource exploitation, and ongoing anti-corporate activism – news that does not receive much mainstream press coverage, but is publicized through electronic networks.

The three categories – political and human rights, information circulation, and economic redistribution/ corporate critique – show a range of activities present in Zapatismo solidarity networks, but questions remain. Do these solidarity activities more closely resemble a social movement or an advocacy network? How do they relate to state structures? Is a common frame being developed among Zapatismo activists in various countries?

Relevance of the nation, the national, and the state

Our survey of transnational Zapatismo suggests the continued relevance of states and nations shaping the opportunity structures of solid-

arity work. Despite claims that the state is now defunct, the Mexican state continues to act as a threat, a resource, and a key target for collective action against the globalism agenda.

The relevance of the state is most obviously illustrated by the Mexican military. Despite President Fox's claim to have pulled back armed forces in the occupied territories of Chiapas, checkpoints are routine and the military is omnipresent.[126] Mexico discourages foreign political observation. The Department of Immigration penalizes those directly entering Chiapas from Guatemala. Human rights observers in the region, who generally enter with tourist visas, risk expulsion. Activists report tapped phone lines and a climate of harassment. At negotiations for the Plan Puebla Panama[127] Fox declared that "[t]here is no longer a conflict in Chiapas, we have blessed peace."[128] Chiapanecos in the militarized regions disagree. In May 2001 the archdiocese of San Cristobal warned of increasing violence from paramilitaries,[129] and the EZLN strongly criticized a public relations campaign designed to give the appearance of peace:

> The war in Chiapas doesn't matter to them? Of course it matters! That's why they drew up this reform [2001 Senate law on indigenous rights]. Because that way they ensure that the war doesn't end, that the soldiers continue with their dirty dealings in Chiapas, that the Zapatistas remain clandestine….[130]

Besides the military dimension of state power, the legislative and bureaucratic arms of the state also shape possibilities for meaningful indigenous autonomy and economic democracy. Michael Walzer argues that a normative commitment to citizenship is insufficient: "[t]here must also be a commitment in practice to the weaker members. This is a commitment that only the state can make in a universalizing way."[131] In Chiapas, this is reflected in the Zapatistas' struggle to make the federal state more accountable to the demands of its weaker members – *campesinos*, indigenous people and women, in particular. They do not dream of a separate indigenous existence outside the Mexican state. According to a declaration of the National Indigenous Congress (CNI):

> 509 years of history have signified nothing but exploitation, discrimination, and misery to our peoples, who are the primordial inhabitants of this nation … this Mexican Nation, born from our seed and heart, was built by powerful rulers in denial of our existence and of our supreme right to walk along our own path – and *by this we don't mean that we deny ourselves of our Fatherland, which was founded with our blood.*[132]

Instead of secession, the vision of indigenous autonomy (expressed by the CNI and the EZLN) aims to create a multi-national entity where different ways of life and ethnicities have rights to autonomy and self-determination.[133] This struggle for a multi-national Mexico and indigenous self-determination is embodied in the San Andrés Accords on Indigenous Rights and Culture, which the Zapatistas negotiated with the government in 1997, and which remain unfulfilled.[134] In February and March 2001, the Zapatistas launched a caravan to Mexico City to lobby Congress and publicize the non-fulfilment of these accords. While international observers provided additional safety along the caravan's journey, what was critical to the caravan's success was the mobilization of Mexican civil society along the journey to Mexico City. It succeeded in this goal and was greeted by approximately 200,000 people in the capital.[135]

Closely related to mobilizing Mexicans behind the San Andrés accords was the goal of lobbying the Mexican Congress for their realization. Put simply, the vision of indigenous autonomy cannot be fulfilled without constitutional and legislative backing of the federal state. However, on April 27, 2001, the Mexican Congress passed a heavily amended version of the accords that was soundly rejected by the EZLN, the CNI, and sympathetic observers like Bishop Samuel Ruiz.[136] The revised law avoided awarding resource control to indigenous communities, transforming indigenous autonomy and territorial control into theoretical principles without a meaningful praxis. The revised law was also criticized for diverting responsibility for indigenous autonomy from the federal to the local level; state legislatures are given power to enact customs of indigenous autonomy into law. According to the CNI, the revised law:

> substantially diverges from the [San Andrés Accords], for it says that the *recognition of the rights of indigenous peoples will occur on the state (and not the federal) level. In reality, this means that our rights and laws will not be respected* … [t]his constitutional reform makes a mockery of our communities by putting into the hands of local authorities the power to define the character of indigenous autonomy and the mechanisms for its implementation.[137]

Without a federally defined mandate, projects to create autonomous communities remain a patchy, hit-and-miss affair that must contend with highly inequitable distributions of land, resources, and political clout on the local level. Without active federal intervention against inequity, there is little space or resources for meaningful projects for autonomous indigenous communities. This reality is instructive for

those who believe the state is no longer relevant for the Zapatista struggle or for struggles against globalism more generally. It also confirms our suspicion that transnational Zapatismo cannot be considered outside the context of the transnationalized Mexican state and its role as chief disciplinarian for globalism. To focus on transnational Zapatismo, or on global information flows is to resort to a self-indulgent myopia that overestimates the importance of the core, and continues traditions of Orientalist scholarship.

Not only does the Mexican state significantly shape opportunity structures, but other states also hinder the Zapatista vision of multi-nationalism and self-determination for indigenous peoples. The United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand are obstructing recent efforts to develop a U.N. declaration recognizing indigenous rights to self-determination and land.[138] Furthermore, peripheral and semi-peripheral actors continually stress the hegemonic role of the United States. Zapatismo solidarity is not just boomerang activism targeting the Mexican government. U.S. activists also target the collusion of their own government in the militarization of Chiapas. In the words of Jeff Moebus:

> I carry in my mind, in my heart, and in my soul the words of a young woman from a Zapatista village we visited last November…. When asked how she thought the problems in Chiapas could be resolved, she fixed every one of us Concerned Gringos dead in the eye and said: "*El problema en Francesco Gomez no es el gobierno de Mexico; el problema es el gobierno de los Estados Unidos*." The problem in Francesco Gomez is not the Mexican government; the problem is the United States government.[139]

While states enforce globalism, the EZLN struggles to reclaim the Mexican state as an expression of national will. Nationalism plays a constitutive role in Zapatismo – a factor not always understood or recognized within solidarity networks outside Mexico. U.S. activists in particular are reluctant to speak of nationalism positively. Ted Lewis, director of a major Chiapas-linked non-profit organization, Global Exchange, depicts nationalism negatively: "I see nationalism as fundamentally very dangerous. When those [nationalistic] forces are let loose in conditions of [economic] crisis, fascism and nationalism are birds of a feather."[140] In contrast, the Zapatistas enthusiastically draw on traditions of Mexican nationalism in their public communications. During the kick-off to the march to Mexico City in February 2001 in San Cristobal, the Zapatistas entered the zocaló with the Mexican flag, followed by the EZLN flag. Although there were cheers for civil society nationally and internationally, praise for the delegates going to Mexico

City focussed on the national, and was followed by cheers for the state and the nation. The delegation's international arm was clearly appreciated, but not depicted as central. As the comandantes boldly declared on the San Cristobal stage on a chilly February night: *Somos indigenas. Somos Mexicanas.* (We are indigenous. We are Mexican.)

The EZLN's use of nationalism has been evident since the first clashes in 1994. An early communiqué spoke of their aspiration to "unite all the Mexican people and their independent organizations around them so that, through varied forms of struggle, a national revolutionary movement will be born with a place for all kinds of social organizations whose honest and patriotic goal is a better Mexico."[141] While the Zapatistas have consistently challenged the ability of the federal government to represent Mexico honestly, they have also refused to accept responsibility for uniting Mexicans in the democratic struggle, claiming this should be done under the auspices of a nationalist democratic project. According to Marcos:

> We do not claim that all honest Mexicans can fit under our Zapatista banner. We offer our flag. But there is a bigger and more powerful flag that can shelter us all. The flag of the national revolutionary movement can cover the most diverse tendencies, opinions, and different types of struggle, as long as they are united to win a common desire and goal: freedom, democracy and justice.[142]

The Zapatistas' emphasis on Mexican nationalism is particularly salient when juxtaposed against Mexico's loss of sovereignty through globalism. Underneath the veneer of Salinas's nationalist discourse, the Mexican state became ever more transnationalized; an American entrepreneur described the regime as "the best thing that has happened to us since López de Santana delivered more than half of the Mexican territory to the United States."[143] The subsequent delegitimization of the PRI opened the way for Fox's electoral victory, but as many observers have noted, it hardly signalled movement away from a neoliberal economic agenda.[144]

While transnational activism is often romanticized as a goal of bottom-up globalization, our observations suggest that the gritty reality of the state as a legislative structure, an arbiter of violent conflict, and a potential redistributive agency remains critical. The power of nationalism, albeit in a sophisticated, multi-national variant, is also exceptionally important to the Zapatista struggle. Obsession about transnational advocacy networks and global civil society can divert our attention

away from how the state shapes the terrain of struggle, and is a primary target of social movements. Wes Rehberg argues against a romanticized interpretation of transnational Zapatismo, and emphasizes that the state is the "only entity right now where the rule of law, such as it may be practiced or formulated, has teeth."[145] While the state shapes the framework for action in Mexico, the state system and its concomitant international political economy continues to shape differential access to power and resources of those involved in Zapatismo within and outside Mexico. Although activists in the core (especially in the United States) may hope to move into a "post-national" age, peripheral actors like the Zapatistas struggle to create democratic, multi-national spaces. This leads to the final point of the case study: what are the nature and limitations of Zapatismo solidarity?

Zapatismo: Network? Social movement? Global civil society?

> The Chiapas uprising has united diverse grassroots movements within Mexico and internationally around the recognition of a common enemy – inspiring a collective Ya Basta! from all the victims of international capital. The Zapatistas see themselves as a simple fragment in this kaleidoscope of the exploited people of the earth. – ChiapasLink.[146]

Like the MAI, the Zapatismo case suggests the difficulty of building a genuine transnational social movement. Organizing, mass mobilization, creating unity, and building a common frame amongst heterogeneous actors are daunting challenges for those contesting globalism *within* national boundaries. These tasks are that much more difficult to achieve transnationally. However, the very existence of Zapatismo, a solidarity network spanning several nations in support of a geographically isolated *campesino* army, suggests that although it is difficult, solidarity is not impossible. Although a transnational social movement may be a distant prospect, a transnational advocacy network is evident, as is an incipient master frame uniting diverse actors across many sectors.

Using the concept of the TAN clarifies the Internet's role in Zapatismo, enabling us to address suspicions that Internet Zapatismo is an inferior activism, insufficiently grounded or politically engaged. Tarrow cautions: "anyone who has caught the internet virus can attest, virtual activism may serve as a *substitute* – and not as a spur – to activism in the real world."[147] Judith Adler Hellman criticizes the "very mixed role of electronic communication," which has provided a "remarkably 'flat-

tened' picture of the actors and events in Chiapas." This technological activism "constitutes a kind of 'virtual' Chiapas that is instantly available to us on a computer screen, but that bears only a very partial resemblance to the 'real' Chiapas."[148]

Although such concerns reflect major issues of standpoint and speaking position, the dichotomy between "real" and "virtual" activism is based on a confusion about multi-scaled strategizing, as well as a highly problematic epistemological position – even when terms like "real" and "virtual" are sceptically bracketed.[149] Since all knowledge of the world is approximated, all activism is similarly mediated by our culturally specific mind-sets and various mediums of information. This is not to deny the importance of personal experience in the development of a political consciousness.[150] However, because mediated social activism is an inevitable feature of social life, particularly given the spatio-temporal compression of globalization, it is misleading to suggest that everyone needs direct experience in Chiapas to be in true solidarity with the Zapatistas.

Seeing the Zapatismo TAN as just one scale of struggle among many helps clear up misplaced animosity, while gaining a realistic sense of what a transnational network can accomplish. The strength of this network lies in its ability to adapt to the changed opportunity structures of global networked capitalism. New technologies have not only facilitated intensive capital accumulation, but have been mobilized as tools of resistance, allowing groups like the Zapatistas to articulate themselves while being marginalized by the dominant corporate media. The Zapatismo TAN has also helped exploit the legitimacy deficits of the transnationalized Mexican state. This strategy has been particularly effective in solidarity efforts organized around human rights, exposing the Mexican state's politics of supremacy and subordination, and juxtaposing it against an incipient transnational value system of human rights.[151]

Struggles against neo-liberalism cannot exist on a purely transnational, national, or even a local scale. When we recognize this, we can see the Internet-related activities of the Zapatismo network not as a distraction from "real" mobilization, but as an invaluable tool that uses networks to transmit information quickly. Transnational information flows are one part of a multi-scaled strategy, but they are not a substitute for face-to-face social movement connections, or projects of mass mobilization. Activists involved in these networks claim nothing

of the sort.[152] Mary-Anne Tenuto of the Chiapas Support Committee writes:

> I agree that the Internet is a cheap and efficient way of disseminating information around the country and around the world. It is best used as a communications tool to reach many people quickly. I would agree that it should not be used to REPLACE local organizing, but to ENHANCE it.[153]

Dan La Botz agrees: "I believe that the Internet represents an extremely useful new tool, but that most problems regarding international solidarity revolve around social and political issues that technology alone cannot resolve."[154] In fact, it is hard to find people who adhere to a revolutionary ideal that is exclusively digital. With the flood of information on the WWW (20–70 messages per day on Chiapas-95 alone), and the wide array of other diverting web sites, it seems unlikely that Zapatismo information is sought by lazy couch-potatoes who only sign e-mail petitions. Our sample of transnational Zapatismo activists suggests that digital information is accessed by those already involved in the Zapatista cause, and who get involved in Zapatismo as part of a long-standing commitment to social change. The Internet's role seems to be more in consolidating advocacy networks than in recruiting the uninitiated.

Activists and academics protesting the social and ecological devastation of globalism are inevitably drawn to the disruptive potential of mass-based mobilization. Transnational advocacy networks, though not themselves movements, can prepare for the emergence of transnational social movements with a common frame and shared identities sustained over time. Tarrow writes, "transnational advocacy networks can help resource-poor actors construct new *domestic* movements out of combinations of indigenous and imported materials."[155] What is critical is that the transition from network to movement not be treated as an automatic evolution, nor should it be assumed that movements operate most effectively at the transnational level. National-level movements may retain importance for logistic and institutional reasons, particularly given the intimate relationship between material inequality and mobility. Although there are some signs of an incipient transnational master-frame contesting neoliberal globalism, and networks of transnational Zapatismo that support Mexican activists, mass mobilizations remain predominantly national, as do targets such as the Mexican Congress, presidential office, and military apparatus.

To build transnational solidarity, a common frame must be shaped from the bottom up, but this is difficult when ideas and outlooks fail to transcend local boundaries. Although theorists may assume that globalization makes increased cross-cultural communication inevitable, humanity continues to be divided by cultural barriers, linguistic gaps, material inequalities, tactical differences, and radically different lifeworlds. Despite the EZLN's explicit military aspirations, some supporters, such as Jorge Aros from Witness for Peace, disagree with these tactics:

> While I personally support Emiliano Zapata's ideals of land reform and indigenous rights, I do not personally support the violence used by the EZLN to bring them to prominence. I view such actions as fomenting the kinds of response visited upon the 45 innocents of Acteal.[156]

Heterogeneous lifeworlds also hinder the formation of a shared frame transnationally. Press releases from Zapatista communities regarding local events (e.g., murders of rival community members, tales of sick animals) are not easily interpreted by solidarity activists outside (or even inside) Mexico.[157] When the EZLN was silent for much of 2000, John Ross wrote of underlying divisions within Zapatista communities:

> [I]f the [EZLN] comandantes are resolved to keep their silences, the Zapatista autonomous communities in the jungle and the highlands continue to churn out a steady stream of "denuncias" (complaints) against local PRI authorities, the military, and even one-time allies in what the EZLN calls its "war against oblivion." … The *denuncias* from the grass roots, while laced with anger and revolutionary resonance, are very local in scope and lack the acute analysis and world vision of the communiques with which Subcomandante Marcos galvanized the nation for years.[158]

Romanticization is another obstacle to developing a common transnational frame.[159] Wes Rehberg notes that "cultural and linguistic differences limit work and mutual understanding" and that there is a "tendency to romanticize communities" and minimize internal divisions – such as expelling women who conceive out of wedlock.[160] Feeding such tendencies are the power and material disparities within Zapatismo networks. These inequalities represent perhaps the most serious impediment to constructing a common transnational frame or transnational solidarity based on equality. The voluntarism of elite participation in advocacy networks is sharply juxtaposed against the drama of survival for *campesinos* in the militarized region. Herein lies the real problem of creating a "virtual Chiapas" – a place where acknowledgment of cultural difference overrides recognition of inequality. This is not simply an epistemological dilemma (how to know the "real Chia-

pas"), but a thorny material problematic haunting all transnational solidarity projects: how do we build a solidarity based on a dual project of cultural exchange and much needed material redistribution?

Our survey strongly suggested that the term "global" does not accurately describe Zapatismo, since network participants come primarily from a limited number of wealthy Western countries, the "minority world."[161] Even the term "transnational" tends to disguise key contradictions between the non-Mexican and Mexican participants who are relatively privileged and the Chiapaneco struggles where Zapatistas are primarily indigenous and generally don't have access to computers. This was dramatically evident on a trip to the Zapatista capital, La Realidad, with a solidarity group of U.S. citizens. While a member of the solidarity group complained loudly of high tuition fees at her California university, several *campesinos* questioned the visiting gringos about work opportunities in the United States and the average hourly wage for illegal migrants. Many elements of solidarity – visiting the region, standing alongside in the face of danger, transferring resources to isolated communities – remain voluntary and will be undertaken only by the most committed activists. Voluntarism is typical of social movements, but in the case of extreme power differentials amongst participants, limits the construction of a solidarity based on equality. Dan La Botz writes:

> Since indigenous peoples, poor people, and working class peoples usually have few economic resources, they find it hard to maintain written, telephonic, electronic and other forms of communication, they cannot afford to travel, and they do not have the economic resources to take time to work on solidarity issues. This imposes a special burden on organizations in wealthier countries to share resources with them.[162]

Our intention in identifying difficulties of constructing solidarity networks across tremendous inequalities and difference is not to dismiss all possibilities for transnational solidarity. What we want to discourage is unreflective assumptions about transnational social movements that obfuscate the persistence of inequality amongst activist communities. Zapatismo does not represent a coherent, transnational social movement. Activists contesting global capital accumulation must contend with the particularities of mobilizing in specific national contexts and the logistic limits to transnational mass mobilization. While a small number of peripatetic activists can attend several anti-globalization protests, for most people, particularly in the majority world, such mobility is impossible. To focus exclusively on such mobility

draws critical resources away from battles in their own home states, against their own governments, and to control local resources.

We also want to discourage the assumption, linked to modern intellectual traditions of universalism, that a common frame extends from indigenous *campesinos* in Chiapas to solidarity activists in the minority world. However, we see possibilities for a unifying master frame centered on criticism of corporate rule, and transnationally coordinated mass mobilization in various national and local contexts. Although transnational mass mobilization may be an unrealistic ideal, ideas readily flow across borders. An emerging master frame linked to Zapatismo is mobilized broadly around resistance to neo-liberalism and corporate rule and cannot be tied to the fate of the Zapatistas. It is connected by shared normative concerns – like the issues of democracy and popular sovereignty that united opposition to the MAI, and resistance to the invasion of corporate-controlled bio-technologies – but is limited by the difficulty of constructing equality and understanding across heterogeneous bodies of activists. In this way, the Zapatista movement is connected to the anti-MAI struggle, and it assisted in developing a master-frame critical of corporate globalism and low-intensity democracy by naming a common enemy: neoliberalism.[163] However a complete master-frame has not gelled around this concept. As the struggle to defeat the MAI showed, discursive shifts are often needed to mobilize in various contexts: nationalism may be particularly salient in some contexts, popular sovereignty and critiques of corporate rule in others.

Conclusion: Solidarity, nations, and hope

How are effective solidarity relationships formed within and across national boundaries? This is not an easy question given the prevalence of indirect, mediated relations of states and market structures.[164] With the horrific record of certain ethnic-nationalisms, it is tempting to conclude that universal citizenship must be the grounding point for progressive political projects. Yet the continued relevance of the state legislating corporate rights agreements suggests greater complexity. Against the cosmopolitan hype, critics like Craig Calhoun argue that:

> states remain the organizations of power through which democratic movements have the greatest capacity to affect economic organization. Given the current organization of the United Nations, states remain the highest level of institutional structure at which programs of democratization themselves can

> consistently be advanced. And states remain the most crucial objects and vehicles of efforts to achieve "self-determination" or autonomy as a political community.[165]

When economic and popular sovereignty are considered, it seems simplistic to assume that any, or all attachments to national bodies are retrograde. Our cases show that national identities are important links between the global and the local. They also suggest that it is possible to have nationally-rooted projects for economic self-determination that also make transnational connections of solidarity with movements in other nations, and that allow for the co-existence of transnational and sub-national identities. Both the Zapatistas, and the anti-MAI forces reacted against the transnationalized states' betrayal of historic legacies of economic nationalism, and mobilized around an incipient transnational master-frame contesting neo-liberal globalism and corporate rule. Our cases also suggest the importance of examining both the nationalist element and the targeting of national governments to determine the part they play in resisting globalism. They are missing pieces within the orthodox globalization narrative. Both cases resist a pull toward myopic localism or cosmopolitan globalism.

Why and how did the movements we examined seek external support? Strategic considerations and differing political opportunity structures were critical factors. To help their domestic struggle against an unresponsive central state and to bring additional resources to an impoverished movement, the Zapatistas asked for and received transnational support – what Keck and Sikkink call the "boomerang effect." In contrast, leading Canadian MAI opponents sought support from network partners abroad, but waged a relatively independent battle against Canadian representatives at the OECD. The Canadian movements had deep pools of resources and support built on strong anti-FTA and anti-NAFTA networks. Canadian movements sought external support because Canada was too weak on its own to veto the MAI at the OECD and because there seemed little prospect of shifting the Canadian government's own determined position, at least at first. In contrast, France's anti-MAI movements appear to have mainly targeted their own state because it was responsive and because France was important enough to derail the MAI by itself. Thus the different contexts of Chiapas, Canada, and France presented different opportunities for transnational coordination and helped structure the nature of support in the different instances.

Like the transnational support for the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and the anti-apartheid campaigns in the 1980s, the continued existence of Zapatismo transnational advocacy networks around Zapatismo is dependent on the continued survival of the Zapatistas. While the Zapatistas have inspired an incipient master-frame around opposition to neoliberalism and corporate rule, this does not indicate that there is a shared transnational project identity or "common way of seeing the world" within Zapatismo – an important criterion for building a transnational social movement. Instead, Zapatismo resembles a transnational advocacy network where information exchange through the Internet is key, but where mass mobilizations continue to exist primarily at national levels. It is premature to assume the development of a transnational Zapatismo social movement.

While many elements of a common frame of analysis are gelling around resistance to globalism, there are still important differences nationally, across larger regions and amongst movements organizing around different issues. Do differences on questions like national or popular sovereignty mean that campaigns against globalism are less effective? Not necessarily. There are independent arenas of opposition in the world that may not be united, but that, when added together, significantly challenge the Washington Consensus and corporate rule.

Meanwhile, we anticipate the deepening of transnational networks forged in anti-MAI campaigns – ties that intensify with each subsequent anti-globalism contention. Rather than mourn the lack of transnational social movements, we could instead investigate how TANs might be a defining feature of emerging resistance to globalism. Although heterogeneity clearly exists, there is a degree of equality and cultural similarity within peripatetic activist communities that possess the resources that make international air travel and face-to-face bonding possible. In addition, common cause will probably endure for some time, because global elites are unlikely to give up attempts to put in place all the elements of a constitution for neo-liberal globalism. Some elements of a genuine transnational social movement are emerging from these campaigns, but this does not mean that nationally based campaigns will necessarily be displaced as central loci of activity, particularly for those in the majority world.[166]

Anti-globalism protests currently show few signs of cooptation and compromise. Is their present radicalism due to the newness of their protest or to the implacability of their critiques? We can speculate that

it is the latter, but it's too early to tell. What is clear is that certain transnational issues have emerged as flash-points of solidarity within the transnational advocacy networks: resistance to neo-liberalism and corporate rule, support for bottom-up democracy, projects for national/popular sovereignty and self-determination, and control over economic resources. The Internet enables the sharing of substantive understanding on this emerging master-frame within advocacy networks. At the same time, our case studies suggest that it is premature to assume the emergence of transnational social movements where there are sustained mobilization, shared identities, and a common understanding of substantive issues, at least for the kinds of movements explored here. This should not surprise us. Domestically and globally, civil society is embedded in inequitable structures of wealth and ownership. This affects the formation of networks, the usage of new technologies like the Internet, and discourages the emergence of a meaningful sense of universal citizenship. Despite the globalizing drive of capital, a universal terrain of struggle and opportunity structures against global capital does not exist.

The 1994 Zapatista uprising alerted the world that globalism and NAFTA would not go uncontested. The campaigns against the MAI signalled the first break in globalism's dam. Fresh from victory, actors, alliances, and advocacy networks attracted new allies and were responsible for the spectacular breakthrough in Seattle. The lessons of Zapatismo, the MAI, and the Battle in Seattle are not about the creation of a global civil society. Bottom-up control over elites will not happen at the level of six-billion people. Although a small group of well-off, committed activists can join forces at different battles around the world, the majority of struggles still occur at home. Zapatista communities do not have the resources to join IMF protestors in Prague or rally against the FTAA in Quebec City.[167] States and nations are still key terrains for self-determination, and most mobilizations occur at national and sub-national levels. At the same time, these struggles may be increasingly coordinated within transnational solidarity networks that challenge the anti-democratic nature of globalism and U.S. hegemony.

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Notes

1. We make no claims that these two cases represent the full range of resistance to corporate globalization. For a typological account of various corporate resistance strategies to globalization, see Amory Starr, *Naming the Enemy: Anti-corporate Movements Confront Globalisation* (New York: Zed Books, 2000). For a slightly older, but still useful survey of grassroots resistance to a "global problematique" of war, famine, eco-disaster, and repression, see Paul Ekins, *A New World Order. Grassroots Movements For Global Change* (New York: Routledge, 1992).
2. Evaluating the spatio-temporal dimension of globalization remains a highly contested empirical terrain. Many authors emphasize either historical continuity or historical discontinuity, yet each camp contains determinist accounts, alongside interpretations stressing agency, transformation, and indeterminacy. For an account that highlights the de-nationalizing effects of globalization on sovereignty and territoriality, while simultaneously emphasizing the continued relevance of state regulatory apparatuses, see Saskia Sassen, *Globalization and Its Discontents* (New York: The New Press, 1998).
3. The FTAA draft agreement is modelled on NAFTA's language on foreign investment. Maude Barlow, "The Free Trade Area of the Americas and the Threat to Social Programs, Environmental Sustainability and Social Justice in Canada and the Americas," Council of Canadians (2001).
4. Saskia Sassen, *Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalisation* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 39.
5. George Philip, *Oil and Politics in Latin America: Nationalist Movements and State Companies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 224. Current moves to privatize PEMEX must face its hallowed place amongst Mexicans. Seventy-seven percent of Canada's oil and gas industry was foreign-owned, but pressed by center-left nationalist movements, Canada took steps to "Canadianise" the industry under public and private ownership. Trudeau's minority government (1972–74), pressed by the New Democrats, took steps to set up PetroCanada, a publicly-owned company. In 1981, an astonishing 84 percent of Canadians backed Canadianisation.
6. David Korten, *When Corporations Rule the World* (West Hartford: Kumerian Press, 1995), 59.
7. Dieter Rucht, "The Transnationalization of Social Movements: Trends, Causes, Problems," in *Social Movements in a Globalizing World*, edited by Donatella della Porta et al. (Houndsmills Hamp.: Macmillan, 1999), 209.
8. *Campesino* is roughly translated as peasantry; *campo* means land.
9. The term "Zapatismo" is also used to refer to the social movements and solidarity

networks supporting the EZLN within Mexico. While this vast topic is critical to a comprehensive understanding of the uprising (and the internal dynamics of political repression in Mexico), our focus here is on the solidarity networks that have emerged outside the state of Chiapas and Mexico. Two concise English-language accounts of the solidarity movement and social activism within Mexico include the ChiapasLink, http://www.chiapaslink.ukgateway.net/ch13.htm and Dan La Botz's *Democracy in Mexico: Peasant rebellion and political reform* (Boston: South End Press, 1995), 65–82. In this article we also are not intending to provide a comprehensive survey of the Zapatista struggle in Chiapas. See, for example, John Ross, *The War Against Oblivion. Zapatista Chronicles, 1994-2000* (USA: Common Courage Press, 2000); Neil Harvey, *The Chiapas Rebellion* (Durham: Duke University Press 1998), and Adolfo Gilly, *Chiapas: La Razón Ardiente: Ensayo Sobre La Rebelión Del Mundo Encantado* (México, D. F.: Ediciones Era, 1997).

10. Patrick Cuninghame and Carolina Ballesteros Coronoa, "A Rainbow at Midnight: Zapatistas and Autonomy," *Capital and Class* 66, Autumn (1998): 12; Roger Burbach, "Roots of the Postmodern Rebellion in Chiapas," *New Left Review* May–June (1994): 113-124; Ana Carrigan, "Chiapas: the First Post-Modern Revolution," *Fletcher Forum of World Affairs* (1995); June Nash, "The first postmodern movement in the Third World," *Latin American Research Review* 30/3 (1995): 36.
11. Noam Chomsky, "Power in the Global Arena," *New Left Review* Summer (1998), Amiel Lecture, London, 28.
12. See Tarrow's critique of the "strong thesis" on the emergence of global civil society. Sidney Tarrow, "Beyond Globalization: Why creating transnational social movements is so hard, and when it is most likely to happen," http://www.antenna.nl/~waterman/tarrow.html. (19 April 2001), *Global Solidarity Dialogue*.
13. Collier argues that it was precisely this reorientation of state policy (away from corporatist inclusion toward free market incorporation) that facilitated the formation of a collective indigenous identity that spoke on behalf of the poor. George Collier, "Restructuring ethnicity in Chiapas and the world," in June Nash et al., editors, *The Explosion of Communities* (Copenhagen, IWGIA Document No. 77, 1995), 10. For other sources on resistance to structural adjustment policies, see John Walton and Charles Ragin, "Global and National Sources of Political Protest: Third World Responses to the Debt Crisis," *American Sociological Review* 55/6: 876–891; John Walton and David Seddon, *Free Markets and Food Riots: The Politics of Global Adjustment* (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1994).
14. Bert Klandermans et al., "Injustice and Adversarial Frames in a Supranational Political Context: Farmers' protest in the Netherlands and Spain," in *Social Movements*, edited by Della Porta et al., 136. For an overaching analytic framework that identifies mechanisms underlying "contentious politics," see Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, *Dynamics of Contention* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
15. Charles Tilly, "Social Movements and National Politics," in *Statemaking and Social Movements: Essays in History and Theory*, edited by Charles Bright and Susan Harding (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1984), 297–317.
16. Goodman argues there are three major interpretations of anti-globalization protest: 1) globalist adaptation, 2) confrontational localism, 3) transnational resistance. He does not conclude that one of these traditions is necessarily more or less desirable than the others, although he does argue that the logic of contestation points toward the third. James Goodman, "Contesting Corporate Globalism: Sources of Power, Channels for Democratisation," in *Prospects for Transnational Democracy*, edited by J. Anderson (London: Routledge, 2001).

17. Ronnie D. Lipschutz, "Reconstructing World Politics: The Emergence of Global Civil Society," *Millennium* 21/3 (1992): 389–420.
18. Ulrich Beck, "The cosmopolitan perspective: sociology of the second age of modernity," *British Journal of Sociology* 51/1 (2000): 86, 90, 92, 102.
19. Richard Falk, "Resisting 'Globalization-from-above' through 'Globalization-from-below,'" *New Political Economy* 2/1 (1997): 17–25. Falk, who first coined the term, "*globalization from below*," depicts it as more an open question than a guaranteed outcome. Falk, "Global civil society: Perspectives, initiatives, movements," *Oxford Development Studies* 26/1 (1998): 99–111.
20. James Goodman, "Transnational politics: political consciousness, corporate power and the internationalising state," manuscript, 2000.
21. Peter J. Smith and Elizabeth Smythe, "Globalization, Citizenship and Technology: The MAI Meets the Internet," *Canadian Foreign Policy* 7/2 (1999): 84.
22. For a provocative and critical account of the contradictions of cosmopolitanism in social thought, see Timothy Brennan, *At Home in the World: Cosmopolitanism Now* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997).
23. Charles Taylor, "Invoking Civil Society," in *Contemporary Political Philosophy*, edited by Robert E. Goodin and Philip Pettit (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), 67–77.
24. C. J. Arthur, "Introduction," in K. Marx and F. Engels, *The German Ideology* (New York: International Publishers, 1970), 5.
25. Paul Stubbs, "Humanitarian Organizations and the Myth of Civil Society," *ArkZin* 55 (1996).
26. Laura MacDonald, "Globalising Civil Society: Interpreting International NGOs in Central America," *Millennium* 23/2 (1994): 276.
27. Stephen Gill coined the phrase the "*new constitutionalism*" to refer to the reorganization of a nation's legal and constitutional practices in order to create special rights for corporate citizens, at the same time it undermines the state's accountability to citizens and the public sphere. Stephen Gill, "Globalisation, Market Civilisation, and Disciplinary Neoliberalism," *Millennium* 2/3 (1995): 399–423. For a concrete example, demonstrating the operation of new constitutionalism, see David Schneiderman, "Investment Rules and the New Constitutionalism," *Law and Social Inquiry* 25/3 (2001): 757–788.
28. Although Naomi Klein persuasively argues that brand-bashing can prove to be a "gateway drug" into the realm of anti-corporate critique, Thomas Frank's work demonstrates that this type of resistance remains amenable to buy offs, cooptation, and incorporation back into commodification cycles. Naomi Klein, *No logo* (Toronto: Knapf, 2000); Thomas Frank, *The Conquest of Cool* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997).
29. Christian Lahusen, "International Campaigns in Context: Collective Action between the Local and the Global," in della Porta et al., editors, *Social Movements in a Globalizing World*, 189–205, 201.
30. Charles Tilly, "Social Movements," 312.
31. Doug Imig and Sidney Tarrow, "The Europeanization of Movements? A New Approach to Transnational Contention," in della Porta et al., editors, *Social Movements in a Globalizing World*, 112–133, 131, 124.
32. Christian Lahusen, "International Campaigns," 190.
33. Paul James, *Nation Formation: Toward a Theory of Abstract Community* (London: Sage, 1996). For a provocative treatise on changing relationships of space and time, and a call for a "grey ecology" that rectifies the "pollution of distances," see Paul Virilio, *Open Sky*, trans. Julie Rose (Great Britain: Verso, 1997), 58.

34. Benjamin Barber, *Jihad versus McWorld* (New York: Random House, 1995); George Ritzer, *The McDonaldization of Society* (Thousand Oaks, Cal.: Pine Forge Press, 2000).
35. Martin Shaw, "Civil Society and Global Politics: Beyond a Social Movements Approach," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 23/3 (1994): 654.
36. A.M. Clark, E. Friedman, and K. Hochstetler, "The sovereign limits of global civil society," *World Politics* 51 (Oct. 1998): 1–35, 3–5.
37. In the rush to employ such sexy new terms as "transnational," it is often forgotten that the Left has long conceptualized the "international" as comprising people-to-people solidarity links, rather than interstate relations.
38. Thomas Risse-Kappen, editor, *Bringing transnational relations back in: non-state actors, domestic structures, and international institutions* (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
39. Keck and Sikkink, "Transnational Advocacy Networks in the Movement Society," in *The Social Movement Society*, editors, David S. Meyer and Sidney Tarrow (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998), 219.
40. Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement. Social Movements and Contentious Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
41. Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists beyond Borders* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), 46.
42. Ibid., 2, 5, 10; Tarrow, *Power in Movement*, 188.
43. It is little discussed in the literature, but advocacy networks also exist at the national level.
44. Keck and Sikkink, "TANs," 236, 237, 220. Keck and Sikkink, *Activists*, 12, 33.
45. Struggles to re-embed power at the national level can be conceptualized as struggles against a "transnational state" that is accountable to corporations rather than citizens. Spatial constraints prohibit an exploration of these debates. See William Robinson and his critics' reflections in *Theory and Society*'s symposium on globalization. Robinson, "Social theory and globalization: The rise of a transnational state," *Theory and Society* 30/2 (2001):157–200.
46. Florence Passy, "Supranational political opportunities as a channel of globalization of political conflicts. The case of the rights of indigenous peoples," in *Social Movements*, edited by della Porta, 161.
47. Ibid., 210, 218; Tarrow, "Beyond Globalization," 3–4.
48. Speech delivered to the WTO Singapore Ministerial, Dec. 1996, Preamble Center, "The MAI in the Words of Framers, Supporters and Opponents." Negotiations on the GATS (General Agreement on Trade in Services), agriculture, the FTAA, and on other areas were underway when this article was written.
49. William Dymond, "The MAI: A Sad and Melancholy Tale," in *Canada Among Nations 1999. A Big League Player?*, edited by Fen Osler Hampson et al. (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1999), 26.
50. Elizabeth May, "Fighting the MAI," in *Dismantling Democracy*, edited by Andrew Jackson and Matthew Sanger (Toronto: CCPA/Lorimer, 1998), 43.
51. France, "Report on the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) Interim Report – Sept. 1998," Min. of Econ, Fin. and Industry, authored by Catherine Lalumière (MEP), Jean-Pierre Landau, Emmanuel Glimet (henceforth Lalumière Report), posted in English on the Council of Canadians' website, http://www.canadians.org/.
52. Lori Wallach, "A Dangerous new manifesto for global capitalism," *Le Monde Diplomatique*, Feb 1998, www.monde-diplomatique.fr/en/1998/02/07mai.html.
53. David Henderson, *The MAI Affair. A story and its lessons* (London, The Royal

Institute of International Affairs, 1999), 23. Henderson was chief economist to the OECD.

54. James Goodman, "Stopping the Juggernaut: the anti-MAI campaign," in *Stopping the Juggernaut. Public Interest versus the Multilateral Agreement on Investment,* edited by J. Goodman and Patricia Ranald (Annandale NSW: Pluto Press, 2000).
55. Donatella della Porta et al., "National mobilization within a Globalizing World," in della Porta, *Social Movements*, 4.
56. Henderson, *The MAI* Affair, 28.
57. Henderson's *MAI Affair* focuses on opposition in Australia and France. Clarke was aware of country-based campaigns in the following OECD states: Canada, the United States, most EU countries – France, Great Britain, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Germany, Italy, Greece, Portugal – and Norway, Turkey, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and Mexico. Tony Clarke, Interview, Aug 4, 1999. We are aware of a Swiss campaign from a report of police raiding the Peoples Global Action Network.
58. Lalumière Report. Italics in original.
59. Maude Barlow, Interview, August 4, 1999.
60. "Network Guerrillas," *Financial Times*, April 30, 1998.
61. Peter J. Smith and Elizabeth Smythe, "Globalization, Citizenship and Technology: The MAI meets the Internet," *Canadian Foreign Policy* 7/2 (1999): 84, 93, emphasis added.
62. While frames relate specific events or issues within social movements, master frames "resonate across movement sectors"; they "enable heterogeneous groups to be allied in common political struggles, and thus lend coherence to the movement politics of a historical conjuncture, or even an era." William K. Carroll and Robert S. Ratner, "Master Frames and Counter-Hegemony: Political Sensibilities in Contemporary Social Movements," *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology* 33/4 (1996): 411.
63. IFG web page, Board of Directors, IFG Associates, www.ifg.org/assoc.html.
64. Clarke, Interview, Aug 4, 1999. There were teach-ins in New York, Washington, and Berkeley (1995 to 1997), to sell-out crowds in each city. Maude Barlow, *The Fight of My Life* (Toronto: HarperCollins, 1998). 200.
65. Multilateral Investment Agreement, MIA, not to be confused with the MAI. Clarke, Interview. Aug 4, 1999.
66. Clarke, Interview, Aug 4, 1999.
67. Ibid.
68. Mel Clark, "Control of Canada's Water Yielded to the U.S. by NAFTA," CCPA Monitor Jul/Aug (2000): 6.
69. Barlow Interview, Aug. 4, 1999.
70. Clarke Interview, Aug. 4, 1999.
71. Peter J. Smith and Elizabeth Smythe, "Globalization, Citizenship and Technology."
72. Maude Barlow, *The fight of my life*, 220.
73. Clarke, Interview, Dec. 4, 2000.
74. Theresa Wolfwood, "On globalization, democracy, MAI and alternatives: a conversation with Maria Mies," *Canadian Dimension* 33/1 (1999): 23–27.
75. Jeremy Nelson, "Toppling the MAI," *Canadian Dimension*, 32/2 (Mar/Apr 1998), 24–26.
76. Goodman, "Juggernaut," 37.
77. Joint NGO Statement. Draft Oct 27, 1997, Update Feb 11, 1998, http://www.citizen.org/pctrade/mai/sign-ons/mai600ngo.htm. Even groups like Friends of the Earth are listed by country (e.g., Friends of the Earth Macedonia).

78. Clarke, Interview, Aug. 4, 1999.
79. Maude Barlow, Tony Clarke, and Lori Wallach, *MAI: The Multilateral Agreement on Investment and the Threat to American Freedom* (Buffalo: Stoddart Publishing, 1998).
80. David Korten, *The Post-Corporate World* (West Hartford: Kumerian Press, 1999), 236–237. Some environmentalists who had supported NAFTA because of its side bar deal on the environment, realized their mistake and then opposed trade deals and fast track.
81. Elizabeth May, Interview, July 27, 1999, Ottawa.
82. Andrew Jackson, Research Director Canadian Labor Congress, Interview, November 24, 1999, Ottawa.
83. Appleton & Associates, "Legal Opinion on National Reservations to the MAI," http://www.appletonlaw.com/MAI/reservations.html.
84. The last three letters are the French acronym for the MAI. Salami also means dirty friend. Operation SalAMI began with opposition to the MAI and has become one of the major non-violent, direction action networks protesting globalism in Quebec. Neville Nankivell, "Anti-MAI propaganda out of control," *Financial Post* 11/66 (1998): 23. The largely francophone protest was significant because most anti-MAI organizing came from English-speaking Canada.
85. Clarke interview, Aug 4, 1999. Elizabeth Smythe argues that Canada favored the WTO over the OECD as the venue to negotiate investment rules. "The Multilateral Agreement on Investment: A Charter of Rights for Global Investors or Just Another Agreement?" in Hampson, *Canada Among Nations*, 239. Also see Dymond, 44.
86. The MAI is the enemy ("ami" means friend).
87. Barlow, *The fight of my life*, 219.
88. Collectif Francais contre Les Clones De L'Ami, (1999) "Accord Des Citoyens et Des Peuples Sur Les Investissements et les Richesses," 6th version, accessed 2000. Susan George homepage, http://www.tni.org/george/.
89. Laxer, "The Movement that Dare Not."
90. Ann Capling and Kim Nossal, "Death of Distance or Tyranny of Distance? The Internet, Deterritorialization, and the Anti-Globalization Movement in Australia," paper to the International Political Science Association, Quebec City, Aug 1 (2000): 12.
91. Much of this account is based on Goodman, "Juggernaut," 49, 37, 42.
92. Capling and Nossal, "Death of Distance," 12.
93. Clarke, Interview, Aug 4, 1999.
94. Wolfwood, "On globalization, democracy, MAI and alternatives: a conversation with Maria Mies," 23.
95. World Ecology, Economy and Development. This section is derived from the "internal intermediate report regarding the activities of WEED and Germanwatch," Bonn, Aug 1998, trans. Ineke Lock.
96. Andreas Rockstein, E-mail Interview, Nov. 8, 2000. Rockstein runs an Internet site against corporate globalization. He claims the German anti-MAI campaign was one of the weakest in the EU.
97. Press release of the Green Group of the European Parliament, Oct. 14, 1998.
98. Lalumière Report, p. 3.
99. W. Dymond, "The MAI," 32. Dymond argues the real reason was the Socialist Government's appeasement of its Communist and Green allies.
100. Clarke, "Building anti-Corporate Coalitions," talk to Parkland Institute's Conference: *Building a Post-Corporate Society*, Nov. 18, 2001. Edmonton.

101. Clarke, E-mail Interview by Gordon Laxer, December 23, 2001.
102. Barlow interview, August 4, 1999.
103. Craig Calhoun, "Nationalism and Civil Society: Democracy, Diversity, and Self-Determination," in *Social Theory and the Politics of Identity*, edited by C. Calhoun (Cambridge Mass.: Blackwell, 1994), 329.
104. Our intention here is to provide a suggestive analysis of the Zapatismo transnational solidarity network, rather than a comprehensive documentation of its existence. For an account of how Zapatismo relates to other international solidarity movements, see Peter Waterman, *Globalisation, Solidarity and the New Social Movements* (London/Washington: Mansell/Cassell, 1998). Thomas Olesen's doctoral dissertation, "Long Distance Zapatismo. Globalization and the Construction of Solidarity" (University of Aarhus, 2002) documents Zapatismo in a comprehensive fashion.
105. This is *not* intended to imply that the Internet is the most important tool in the Zapatista struggle more generally. There is substantial disagreement on the role of the Internet supporting the "real life" EZLN. For two radically diverging viewpoints, see Judith Adler Hellman's critique, "Real and Virtual Chiapas: Magic Realism and the Left," published in the *Socialist Register 2000* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2000) (http://www.monthlyreview.org/sr2k.htm), and Harry Cleaver's response, "The Virtual and Real Chiapas Support Network: A review and critique of Judith Adler Hellman's "Real and Virtual Chiapas" (http://www.eco.utexas.edu/Homepages/Faculty/Cleaver/anti-hellman.html). Another critique by Josh Paulson, and rebuttal by Hellman can be found in *Socialist Register 2001* (http://www.yorku.ca/socreg/).
106. Robert Latham, "Information Technology and Social Transformation," *International Studies Review* 4/1 (2002):106. Manuel Castells, *The Network Society* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996).
107. A "second wave" of information technology (IT) research rejects the idea of the Internet as a "placeless" cyberspace, and sees IT as inextricably embedded in social life. However "disembedded" and "unreal" the cyber world may appear, the production and consumption of this technology is deeply embedded in systems of corporate concentration of wealth, and north-south power inequities (referred to as the "digital divide"). As Latham writes, "while these networks can seem open and expansive, they also are structures of control that can channel our lives into delimited choices and menus," Latham, "Information technology," 106, 102. Depicting globalization as a "placeless" phenomenon is a ubiquitous tendency in globalization scholarship more generally, contraindicated by Sassen, *Globalization*, and J. Comaroff and J. L. Comaroff, editors, *Millennial Capitalism and the Culture of Neoliberalism* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2001), 7, 13. For an account of the embeddedness of IT within a "developing country" (Trinidad) that also contradicts the idea of a simplistic "digital divide," see Miller and Slater, *The Internet: An Ethnographic Approach* (Oxford: Berge, 2000). For a critical account of digital technology and democracy, see Darin Barney, *Prometheus Wired. The Hope for Democracy in the Age of Network Technology* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2000).
108. We are not attempting to carry out a positivist project of "objective" data collection quantifying the volume of Internet activity. Ours is a deliberately interpretative reading that focuses on political themes emerging through the discourse produced by the solidarity network. For a discussion of the methodological quandaries surrounding qualitative research on the Internet, see Chris Mann and Fiona

Stewart, *Internet Communication and Qualitative Research: A Handbook for Research Online* (London: Sage, 2000).

109. Harry Cleaver's web-site: http://www.eco.utexas.edu/faculty/Cleaver/zapsincyber.html. "Zapatistas in Cyberspace," is a map to the many Zapatismo sites available. The electronic listserv, Chiapas-95, based in University of Texas, Austin, is not an unproblematic data source, but remains one of the most extensive and reliable sources of information on Chiapas, particularly to English-language observers who reside primarily outside of Mexico: http://www.eco.utexas.edu/faculty/Cleaver/chiapas95.html.
110. The Steering Committee of the Civil Society "The Bees," "En J. Aros, Abejas document re Acteal, Sep 07," September 9, 2000, Email Listserv. Chiapas95.
111. Keck and Sikkink, *Activists*, 12.
112. For two examples, see Michael A. De Yoanna, "Denver Protests of Trade with Mexico, July 24th," July 28, 2000, Email Listserv. Chiapas95-English. http://www.eco.utexas.edu/faculty/Cleaver/chiapas95.html. Mike Burke, *New York City Independent Media Center*, "En IMC, Paper airplanes attack Mex. consulate in New York City, Sept 9th," Sept. 9, 2000, Email Listerv. Chiapas95.
113. For example, Wolf Ruthar Born, Germany's ambassador to Mexico, toured Chiapas in February 2000: "I want to know about the armed conflict in Chiapas that occupies the front pages of German newspapers." Associated Press, "German Ambassador Begins Tours of Chiapas," February 18, 2000, Email Listserv. Chiapas95-English, http://www.eco.utexas.edu/faculty/Cleaver/chiapas95.html.
114. Mark Stevenson, Associated Press, "Mexican Officials Defend Expulsions," January 7th 2000, Email Listserv. Chiapas95-English, http://www.eco.utexas.edu/faculty/Cleaver/chiapas95.html.
115. Ernesto Ledesma Arronte, Gustavo E. Castro Soto, Tedford P. Lewis, Ryan M. Zinn (editors and coordinators), *Always Near, Always Far: The Armed Forces in Mexico* (Mexico: Global Exchange, *Centro de Investigaciones Económicas y Politicas de Acción Comunitaria* (CIEPAC), and *Centro Nacional de Comunicación Social A. C.,* 2000).
116. Alejandro Ruiz, Associated Press (2000) "AP, Robinson Decries Mexican HR Abuses," November 26th, November 27, 1999, Email Listserv. Chiapas95-English, http://www.eco.utexas.edu/faculty/Cleaver/chiapas95.html.
117. This is not to say that the Mexican state's control over the media has been broken. Television coverage, in particular, is still highly concentrated, and not particularly critical of the neoliberal agenda or military-sponsored paramilitary repression in Chiapas.
118. Keck and Sikkink, *Activists*, 21.
119. Wes Rehberg, E-mail Interview, October 13th, 2000.
120. Subcomandante Marcos (1996). "RICA: AN OPEN CALL TO A DISCUSSION," accessed Oct. 1, 2000, Internet Web Site, Accion Zapatista, http://www.utexas.edu/students/nave/.
121. The left-leaning newspaper *La Jornada* is also renowned for being a reliable source of information on the Zapatista struggle. In addition, several influential film documentaries have been made on Chiapas, including Nettie Wild's 1999 documentary entitled, "A Place Called Chiapas." The Chiapas Media Project trains indigenous communities to use film equipment. This enables them to represent themselves to the outside world, http://www.chiapasmediaproject.org/.
122. *Roja Intercontinental de Comunicación Alternativa (RICA)*; Intercontinental Network of Alternative Communication. Subcomandante Marcos (1996). "RICA:

AN OPEN CALL TO A DISCUSSION," Accessed October 1, 2000. Internet Web Site. Accion Zapatista. http://www.utexas.edu/students/nave/.

123. Antonio Castillo, *La Jornada*, "Ojarasca; The Chemical War in the Selva Lacandona," October 4th, 2000, Email Listserv. Chiapas95-English, http://www.eco.utexas.edu/faculty/Cleaver/chiapas95.html.
124. *Escuelas para Chiapas* – Schools for Chiapas, "Chiapas Schools Update," February 7, 2000, Email Listserv. Mexicopeace.
125. ChiapasLink. "Chapter 2 Solidarity," accessed October 12, 2000, Internet Website, ChiapasLink. http://www.chiapaslink.ukgateway.net/ch2.html.
126. Ledesma Arronte et al., *Always Near Never Far*.
127. The Plan Puebla-Panama ("Plan of the 3 Ps") is supposedly designed to promote sustainable development through the integration of tourism, trade, education, environmental management, and power grids from Mexico's Puebla state to Panama. According to critics, "[t]he PPP, no matter how hard they would like to present it as an economic project that will benefit the indigenous population of Chiapas and the entire southeast, is not an independent project designed with these aims; it is an economic project rooted in the legal frame of the Free Trade Areas of the Americas (FTAA)." Human Rights Center, Miguel Agustin Pro Juárez (June 15, 2001) "Press Release," accessed June 2001, Internet, *Global Exchange,* http://www.globalexchange.org/campaigns/mexico/news/prodh061501.html.
128. *La Jornada*, June 15, 2001.
129. EFE (May 10, 2001) "Mexican Church warns of Growing Paramilitary Presence in Chiapas," Internet, accessed June 2001, *Global Exchange*, http://www.globalexchange.org/campaigns/mexico/news/efe051001.html.
130. EZLN Communique (April 29, 2001) Internet, accessed June 2001, http://www.globalexchange.org/campaigns/mexico/news/communique042901.html.
131. Michael Walzer, "The Concept of Civil Society," in *Toward a Global Civil Society*?, edited by Michael Walzer (Providence: RI: Berhahn Books, 1995), 3.
132. National Indigenous Congress, "Declaration by the national Indigenous congress about the Law of Indigenous rights," May 1, 2001, Internet, accessed Jun 29, 2001, http://www.globalexchange.org/campaigns/mexico/news/050101.html. Emphasis ours.
133. According to the EZLN: "[w]e do not want independence from Mexico, we want to be part of Mexico, to be Mexican indigenous…. We want to be first-class citizens and to be part of the country's development, but we want to be so without ceasing to be indigenous." EZLN (February 2001) "FAQ on March," accessed April 18, 2001, Internet. http://flag.blackened.net/revolt/mexico/ezln/2001/marcos_faq_feb.html.
134. The San Andrés accords were revised by the COCOPA (an all-party Congressional Committee for Concord and Pacification) in December 1996. Although the PRI negotiators originally agreed to this interpretation, officials from the presidential office quickly reneged and came back with a watered-down version, arguing that the COCOPA version gave too much autonomy to indigenous communities and would lead to the "balkanization" of Mexico. Some observers suggest that the federal government's real concern is not political disintegration, but a reluctance to hand over resources to indigenous groups, a transfer legislated in the COCOPA version. This development would threaten the interests of multinationals eager to exploit the rich timber, oil, and pharmaceutical resources of the Lacandón rainforest. Andrés Barreda, "Globalization and Militarization," *Always Near, Always Far*, 165–197; Narco News Bulletin, "Fox's First Challenge: The San Andrés Peace

Accords," accessed April 2001, Internet, http://www.narconews.com/mextransition2.html.

135. Al Giordano, *The Nation*, "En Nation, A-Giordano, Zapatistas on the march, Mar 22," March 23, 2001, Email Listserv. Chiapas95, http://www.eco.utexas.edu/faculty/Cleaver/chiapas95.html.
136. The bill requires ratification by the legislatures of the 31 Mexican states and the federal district. A chronology of events surrounding the Indigenous Rights Bill, and the unsuccessful challenges made to it in the Mexican Supreme Court, can be found on the Global Exchange website. See http://www.globalexchange.org/campaigns/mexico/news/20020913-349.html.
137. National Indigenous Congress (2001), "Declaration by the National Indigenous Congress," translated by Agustin J. Vila-Sakar and B. J. Kowalski, accessed June 29, 2001, Internet, *Global Exchange*, http://www.globalexchange.org/campaigns/mexico/news/050101.html. Emphasis ours.
138. The Associated Press (1999). "US opposition to Indigenous Rights Campaign," August 15, 1999. Email Listserv. Chiapas95-English. http://www.eco.utexas.edu/faculty/Cleaver/chiapas95.html.
139. Jeff Moebus, "Jeff Moebus: Chiapas and the Presidential Campaign in the U.S., July 29," July 29, 2000, Email Listserv. Chiapas95-English. http://www.eco.utexas.edu/faculty/Cleaver/chiapas95.html. Typographical errors in the website's Spanish quote are corrected here.
140. Ted Lewis, Interview, January 12, 2001, San Cristobal, Chiapas, Mexico.
141. Zapatista Army of National Liberation, *Shadows of Tender Fury: The Letters and Communiqués of Subcomandante Marcos and the Zapatista National Army of Liberation*, Frank Bardacke, Leslie Lopez, and the Watsonville Human Rights Committee, translator (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1995), 137.
142. Ibid, 93.
143. S. Hilbert, "For Whom the Nation? Internationalization, Zapatismo, and the Struggle Over Mexican Modernity," *Antipode* 29/2 (1997): 115–148; J. Saxe-Fernández, "The Chiapas Insurrection: Consequences for Mexico and the United States," *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society* 8/2 (1994):325.
144. C. Gilberth and G. Otero, "Democratization in Mexico: The Zapatista Uprising and Civil Society," *Latin American Perspectives* 119 (28/4) (2001): 7–29.
145. Wes Rehberg, E-mail interview, October 12, 2000.
146. ChiapasLink. (2000), "Chapter 1.3 Resistance to Globalization," accessed October 12, 2000, Internet, ChiapasLink. http://www.chiapaslink.ukgateway.net/ch13.htm.
147. Tarrow, 1998, *Activists*, 193.
148. Judith Hellman, "Real and Virtual Chiapas."
149. Paulo Freire understood this relationship as a dialogue between the world (objective reality) and consciousness (subjective reality); although they are mutually constituted, there is always a certain distance between them. Paulo Freire and Donaldo P. Macedo, "A Dialogue: Culture, Language, and Race," *Harvard Education Review* 65/3 (1995): 387, 388.
150. As Paulo Freire writes, "[s]olidarity requires that one enter into the situation of those with whom one is in solidarity; it is a radical posture." Paulo Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (New York: Continuum Books, 1970/95), 31. Josée Johnston and James Goodman, "Activism, Detachment, and the Ivory Tower: Freirean Lessons for Globalization Research," forthcoming.
151. One particularly interesting case involved the now infamous leaked memo from Riordan Roett to Chase Manhattan Bank's Emerging Markets division. In the

memo, Roett, on leave as Director of John Hopkins University's Latin American Studies program, advised the Mexican government of the "need to eliminate the Zapatistas to demonstrate their effective control of the national territory and of security policy." This memo was widely distributed through *Zapatismo* listservs and websites and is thought to have been a key part of the decision to halt the military offensive in Chiapas. For a list of the many electronic messages and political implications of this memo, see the Chiapas95 archive at http://burn.ucsd.edu/.archives/chiapas-l/1995.11/msg00080.html.

152. The Irish Solidarity sites report that "[t]he Internet is a wonderful way of finding out information and making links but perhaps it is too easy to passively consume." Irish Solidarity, (February 2001) "*The Struggle Site,*" accessed March 2001, Internet, Irish Solidarity Network, http://flag.blackened.net/revolt/revolt.html.
153. Mary Anne Tenuto, E-Mail Interview, October 13, 2000.
154. Dan la Botz, E-Mail Interview, October 13, 2000.
155. Tarrow, *The Social Movement Society*, 1998, 192.
156. Jorge Aros, E-Mail Interview, October 12th, 2000.
157. For example, Community of Union Progreso, "Enclave, Denunciation from Union Progreso, October 2nd," October 4th, 2000, Email Listserv. Chiapas95-English. http://www.eco.utexas.edu/faculty/Cleaver/chiapas95.html.
158. John Ross, "J. Ross. Are Zaps history? Oct. 4," October 5, 2000, Email Listserv. Chiapas95-English. http://www.eco.utexas.edu/faculty/Cleaver/chiapas95.html.
159. While Harry Cleaver minimizes the problem, Judith Adler Hellman suggests it is specially connected to Zapatismo, and not indicative of a broader, and more long-standing problem that befalls transnational solidarity generally, especially given the severity of material inequality. See note 123.
160. Wes Rheberg, E-Mail Interview, October 13, 2000.
161. Gustavo Esteva and Madhu Suri Prakash, *Grassroots Post-Modernism* (London: Zed Books. 1998).
162. Dan La Botz, E-Mail Interview, October 23, 2000, our emphasis.
163. Howard La Franchi, *The Christian Science Monitor*, "En CSM,Out of the jungle, a global hero, Mar 20" (March 15, 2001), Email Listserv. Chiapas95. http://www.eco.utexas.edu/faculty/Cleaver/chiapas95.html.
164. David Harvey, "Class Relations, Social Justice, and the Politics of Difference," in *Place and the Politics of Identity* (London: Routledge, 1993), 56; Craig Calhoun, "Indirect Relationships and Imagined Communities: Large Scale Social Integration and the Transformation of Everyday Life," in *Social Theory for a Changing Society*, edited by P. Bourdieu and J. S. Coleman (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 95–120.
165. Craig Calhoun, *Social Theory and the Politics of Identity*, 307.
166. Jeffrey Ayres, "Transnational Contention Against Neo-liberalism: International Political Processes and the Structuring of Activism Opposed to the Global Economy," *Mobilization: an International Journal*, Spring (2001).
167. Not only do Zapatista communities lack the resources to globe-trot *en masse*, but this would threaten the accompaniment programs already in place. When the Zapatista caravan to Mexican City left in February 2001, for example, it attracted many foreign human rights observers. San Cristóbal was cleared of "gringos," and the concern was that without foreigners in threatened communities, paramilitaries would feel free to attack with impunity.